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THE TRADEMARK/CoPYRIGHT DIVIDE 
Laura A. Heymann* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I N the mid-1980s, the well-known postmodern artist Jeff Koons dis-played a sculpture called "String of Puppies" in a New York gallery.! The sculpture was based wholly on a photograph, taken by a man 
named Art Rogers, of a couple with their arms full of puppies; Koons's 
sculpture, intended as a commentary on how mass-produced art has 
caused societal deterioration, caricatured the subjects of the photograph 
by placing flowers in their hair and clown noses on the puppies they were 
holding.2 Rogers, perhaps not surprisingly, brought suit against both 
Koons and his gallery and won a grant of summary judgment, which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.3 Per-
haps even less surprisingly, Rogers's successful claim was one for copy-
right infringement: Rogers alleged that Koons had created an 
unauthorized derivative work, and the Second Circuit rejected Koons's 
attempt to take advantage of copyright law's fair use provisions.4 But the 
ease with which Rogers brought, and the Second Circuit analyzed, Rog-
ers's copyright infringement claim masks the fact that the interest Rogers 
was seeking to protect was probably not a copyright interest at all. Rog-
ers was contending neither that Koons was interfering with Rogers's ex-
ploitation of his own photograph nor that he was appropriating a market 
* © Laura A. Heymann 2006. Assistant Professor of Law, College of William & 
Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Many thanks to Tricia Bellia, Laura Bradford, Rob-
ert Brauneis, Michael Carroll, Susan Crawford, Graeme Dinwoodie, Stacey Dogan, Dave 
Fagundes, Brett Frischmann, Eric Goldman, Ellen Goodman, Trotter Hardy, Cynthia Ho, 
Tim Holbrook, Sonia Katyal, Bobbi Kwall, Greg Lastowka, Mark Lemley, Joe Liu, Mike 
Madison, Paul Marcus, Mark McKenna, Tom Nachbar, David Post, Peter Shane, Kathy 
Strandburg, Rebecca Tushnet, Polk Wagner, Katja Weckstrom, Phil Weiser, Fred Yen, and 
Jonathan Zittrain for helpful comments and criticism, and to Tyler Akagi for research assis-
tance. This Article benefited greatly from presentations at faculty colloquia at the William 
& Mary School of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, and the University of 
Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law, as well as at the Southeastern Association of Law 
Schools' New Scholar Workshop, the 2006 Works in Progress Intellectual Property Collo-
quium, the 2006 Philadelphia Colloquium, and the 2007 Chicago Intellectual Property 
Colloquium. 
1. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992). 
2. /d. 
3. /d. at 305-06. 
4. /d. at 308-09. The Second Circuit concluded that despite Koons's claim that his 
work was a commentary on, and not merely a copy of, Rogers's work, Koons had not 
sufficiently communicated this message to the public. !d. at 310. 
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open to Rogers without Rogers's authorization5-indeed, the sculpture 
had value in the marketplace only because Koons's name was attached to 
it.6 Rather, Rogers seemed more concerned with whether Koons's sculp-
ture altered viewers' association with Rogers's work or, more generously, 
whether Koons's sculpture somehow conveyed to viewers that Rogers au-
thorized or sponsored Koons's work.7 These interests, however deeply 
felt, may be described as interests in the integrity of one's work, in 
(mis)attribution, or in a right of publicity-but they are not copyright 
interests. And yet the current state of copyright law permitted-perhaps 
even encouraged-Rogers to couch his claim as a copyright law one. 
Commentators, too, describe similar conflation as they consider the as-
sertion of copyright law claims in the second-generation creator world. 
In 2005, Professor Larry Lessig presented a lecture at the Michigan State 
University College of Law in which he described (and showed to his audi-
ence) various creative endeavors involving copyrighted works (what he 
termed "remix culture") that presumably could not have been created 
had the original content owner exercised the full extent of its rights under 
U.S. copyright law.8 Lessig described, for example, a video in which the 
Lionel Richie/Diana Ross song "Endless Love" is played over video clips 
of President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair.9 
"Whatever you think of Tony Blair, whatever you think of the War, 
whatever you think of President Bush," Lessig related, "the one thing you 
cannot question about that clip is what the lawyers for the Lionel Richie 
estate said when [copyright] permission was sought to synchronize 
Richie's music with that set of images. The lawyer said, 'No we won't 
give you permission because it is not funny.' "10 Whether the story is true 
or apocryphal, two points seem relevant: U.S. copyright law would allow 
Richie to assert such a claim to prohibit use of the work, and the claim is 
not, at heart, a claim that aligns with copyright law's interests. As with 
Rogers, Richie's claim is not that the video's creator has engaged in an 
impermissible economic exploitation of the work that interferes with 
5. See Andrew R. Bechtel & Arati R. Karwar, Copyright and the Creative Use of 
Visual Artworks in the 1990s, 4 CoMM. L. & PoL'Y 431, 460 (1999) ("[I]t seems unlikely 
that the value of the works of the visual artists who sued Jeffrey Koons would suffer as a 
result of his uses."). 
6. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304. 
7. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was Rogers's true interest in bringing suit. 
See, e.g., John M. Leighty (UPI), Feb. 9, 1990 (quoting Rogers as saying, "I kept looking at 
the photograph and his sculpture and it was outrageous how he exploited my work and 
called it his art. It was my idea, my concept and my visual image."); Liz Lufkin, Art 
World's Tradition of Subtle Plagiarism, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1990, at B4 (quoting Donald 
Prutzman, Rogers's attorney, as saying," 'I was shocked by the similarity and the fact that 
he'd done it without any acknowledgment to Art or business relationship with him.' "). 
8. Lawrence Lessig, Creative Economies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 33, 39 (2006) (pro-
viding a transcription of the Second Annual Distinguished Lecture in Intellectual Property 
and Communications Law). 
9. ld. at 37. 
10. /d. at 39. Lessig continued: "So, we set up a system requiring permission, yet per-
mission is not coming. And so people are faced with the choice to obey the law or not to 
obey the law, to create or not to create." /d. 
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Richie's actual or potential market for the work. Rather, Richie's claim 
(at least, as articulated by Lessig) is that the work is being used to convey 
a particular (political) message, one with which Richie does not wish to 
be associated. A deeply felt interest, perhaps, but probably not one 
based in copyright law. 
We can find many other stories like these: examples of first-generation 
creators using the blunt tool of copyright law to restrict use of their works 
by second-generation creators, even where the interests sought to be pro-
tected inhere in integrity, reputation, or false association rather than ex-
ploitation, market substitution, or incentive destruction.11 And, not 
surprisingly, cases like these arouse great concern on the part of copy-
right minimalists, who quite rightly fear that overuse of copyright law to 
restrict use and dissemination of copyrighted works thwarts the creativity 
of second-generation creators.12 But, properly recounted, these stories 
are not about creators who are seeking to control the use of the work qua 
work: the number of copies that are distributed or the exploitation of the 
work in derivative form (such as in a movie or a translation). In other 
11. See, e.g., Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. 
Colo. 2006) (copyright infringement claim brought against distributors of edited copies of 
plaintiffs' films); Jackson v. Warner Bros., 993 F. Supp. 585, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (African 
American artist protesting use of his artwork in Warner Bros. film). See generally Bechtel 
& Korwar, supra note 5, at 440-58 (citing examples); Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Per-
ception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REv. 705, 
744-45 (2005) (citing examples). The Church of Scientology is a notorious, and much exco-
riated, user of copyright law to restrict dissemination of church documents by critics. See, 
e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66 
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.N.E.T., Inc. , 907 F. Supp. 1468, 1469 (D. 
Colo. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1364-65 (E. D. Va. 1995). As 
to Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. , 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), in 
particular (involving a satire of the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style of the children's 
book author), Judge Kozinski and Christopher Newman write: 
The presumption that an injunction is available to stop copyright infringe-
ment is particularly troubling in this case, because the only real harm was the 
prospect of the author's work being associated with something unsavory. Af-
ter all, it's not likely that a lot of parents would decide to pass up Green Eggs 
and Ham and bring Dr. Juice home to their kids instead. 
Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. CoPYRIGHT 
Soc'v U.S.A. 513, 518 (1999); see also id. at 519 (suggesting, without further comment, that 
trademark law might be the better vehicle for Seuss Enterprises' claims). Even J.K. Rawl-
ing, author of the Harry Potter series, who reportedly tolerates significant use of her work 
in fan fiction efforts, apparently uses copyright law to restrain work that "purports to be 
written by Rawling herself' or is pornographic. Tracy Mayor, Taking Liberties with Harry 
Potter, BosToN GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at 14. 
One might contend that the concerns of such creators sound more in the belief that 
second-generation creators are altering the copyright owner's intended message in the 
work and thus that recharacterization of this claim should mirror dilution, not infringe-
ment. See, e.g., Bradford, supra, at 746-52. But there are strains of these concerns even in 
a straightforward infringement action, in which the rationale underlying the claim is not 
only that the trademark owners will be deprived of a sale but also that consumers will hold 
the trademark owner's brand in lesser regard as a result of mistakenly choosing the in-
fringer's product. My skepticism of dilution law more generally, see Laura A. Heymann, 
Metabranding and Intermediation: A Response to Prof. Fleischer, 12 HARV. NEG. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2007), renders further consideration of this point in this Article 
impracticable. 
12. Kozinski & Newman, supra note 11, at 525. 
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words, these creators are not truly seeking to trade on the incentives 
given to them by copyright law and the economic rights that come from 
the limited monopoly copyright law grants.B Rather, the motivating fac-
tor for these artists appears to be something quite distinct: perhaps a con-
cern that the public will mistakenly conclude that the artists have 
authorized the use of their work in the manner at issue or perhaps a con-
cern that the political or other message being conveyed by the second-
generation creator will disrupt consumer associations with the original 
artist. If this is the case, then what is motivating these plaintiffs aren't 
truly copyright concerns at all-if anything, they are trademark-type con-
cerns (although whether they are strong or legally cognizable trademark-
type concerns is another matter). Trademark law is, after all, concerned 
not with controlling the distribution of goods qua goods; it is concerned 
with the way in which the source (or sponsorship) of those goods is 
presented to the public.14 But because U.S. copyright law currently ac-
commodates these interests indirectly (by allowing a copyright owner to 
bring suit to enjoin most unauthorized uses of a work), neither courts nor 
creators are forced to recognize this distinction. 
We might care, however, about correctly sorting these interests into 
their respective categories for one reason beyond mere doctrinal integ-
rity: By allowing copyright to reach beyond its core purpose-to offer 
incentives for creation that resolve the free-rider/nonrivalrous goods 
problem-courts grant first-generation creators the very power to thwart 
second-generation creators that Lessig and others fear. Were courts to be 
more vigilant about policing the line between copyright claims and non-
copyright claims-in other words, forcing content owners to assert under 
copyright law only those claims that are concerned with the use of the 
work qua work-we might see a world in which the broad injunctive re-
lief available to prevailing copyright owners appears less frequently, re-
placed by narrower forms of injunctive relief tailored to the reputational 
harms content owners are asserting, such as disclaimers or credit lines. 
But content owners not only currently have no motivation to abandon 
their copyright claims in these situations, they also currently cannot easily 
assert their reputational or attributional interests under any other regime. 
Although a cornerstone of the European moral rights regime, a right to 
attribution (or, relatedly, a right to a disclaimer of nonattribution) has 
never had more than a toehold in U.S. intellectual property law.15 And 
whatever such rights federal courts had been willing to find in the Lan-
ham Act have now largely been eviscerated following the United States 
Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp.,16 in which the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to use the 
13. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2006). 
14. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995). 
15. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 
354 (2006). But see 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (providing visual artists with limited moral 
rights). 
16. 539 u.s. 23 (2003). 
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Lanham Act to require attribution for a film in the public domain (and 
thus free from copyright). Part of the Court's resistance in Dastar arose 
from its conclusion that the bargain inherent in U.S. copyright law re-
quires unfettered access to the work once the copyright term ends in ex-
change for the benefits afforded the creator during the term.17 Any 
requirement of attribution or disclaimer would impose a restriction on 
the public domain that copyright law cannot tolerate; accordingly, trade-
mark law-based claims must give way.18 But this view mischaracterizes 
both the nature of the copyright bargain and the scope of trademark law. 
Properly construed, the copyright bargain cedes to the public only the 
rights given to the creator during the copyright term: the exclusive right 
to control copies, distribution, display, performance, and derivative 
works.19 Enforcement of other interests based on other legal regimes 
shouldn't necessarily interfere with the public's ability to exploit any of 
the rights it receives as part of the copyright bargain. 
In this Article, I want to explore the notion that one solution to the 
threat copyright law poses to "remix culture" is not to reform copyright 
law-at least not in the ways that are typically proposed, such as ex-
panding notions of fair use or reinstating copyright formalities.20 Instead, 
we might ask courts to pay more attention to the types of claims content 
owners are asserting as copyright claims and force claims that are really 
about non-copyright law concerns into a separate regime. (As I will dis-
cuss, I propose the doctrine of copyright misuse as the mechanism by 
which to accomplish this reallocation of claims.21 ) The "separate regime" 
resides, I think, in trademark law's realm,22 although it is not necessarily 
coextensive with trademark law properly construed; accordingly, it de-
pends to some extent on both the willingness to recognize the possibility 
17. /d. at 33-34. 
18. /d. at 33-36. 
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106. 
20. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 8, at 39-42. 
21. Greg Lastowka has identified much the same issue but proposes an amendment to 
copyright law's fair use provisions as the solution. See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: 
Copyright and the Right to Credit, 48-50, available at http://works.bepress.com/lastowka/2 
(proposing that the fair use factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107 be amended to include consideration 
of whether the alleged infringer has provided attribution to the author of the work). Fred 
Yen proposes greater judicial attention to First Amendment concerns regarding what he 
terms "aggressive copyright claims." Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and 
Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. REv. 673, 688-92 (2003). Laura Bradford has 
noted the presence of branding-type issues in many copyright law claims but proposes 
greater attention to cognitive research within the existing fair use framework. See Brad-
ford, supra note 11, at 709. Relatedly, Mark Lemley has suggested that the fair use doc-
trine "should separate the idea that the copyright owner should be compensated for a use 
from the idea that the copyright owner should be able to control that use." Mark Lemley, 
Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing? 3, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cmf?abstract_id=917161 (proposing alternative remedy scheme). 
22. Throughout this Article, the term "trademark" should be read as a shorthand en-
compassing the variety of interests addressed under the Lanham Act, including unfair com-
petition and false advertising interests. This shorthand is not meant to negate the fact that 
attributional and associational interests are distinct interests and so may require different 
analyses even within the general framework proposed in this Article. 
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of an attributional-type right in trademark's domain for the relatively 
small category of claims for which a harm can be articulated and the re-
sponsibility of ensuring that this recognition does not unduly expand 
trademark law.23 Not every perceived harm that sounds in reputational 
or attributional interests is, in fact, a viable legal claim-indeed, very few 
such claims may survive once they are reconceptualized, and this is the 
point. In other words, we should not simply recast conceptually problem-
atic copyright claims as doctrinally problematic trademark claims.24 
Under such a construct, it seems that assertion of this trademark/copy-
right divide should not be limited to works under copyright but should 
also continue into the post-copyright realm of the public domain. Once 
we conclude that the attributional or associational interests content own-
ers are attempting to vindicate are not properly asserted as copyright 
claims, there is no coherent reason to let notions of the public domain 
disturb this distinction. 
This renewed attention to some form of a limited attribution-type 
right-whether accomplished judicially or legislatively-might well have 
a salutary effect on U.S. intellectual property law more generally by ben-
efiting both sides of the copyright maximization debate. First, it provides 
content owners with a more legitimate, and more robust, method of as-
serting the associational claims that motivate the kinds of actions I de-
scribe here, rather than effecting a doctrinal misfit by shoehorning those 
claims into the copyright format.25 And second, it eliminates the need 
(and therefore, the ability) of content owners to use copyright law to 
achieve these associational goals, thus eliminating the ability to restrict 
dissemination of the work outright in favor of (one hopes) a more limited 
remedy of disclosure and/or disclaimer.26 
Despite the benefits that might accrue to the public if there existed a 
greater recognition of the different goals of copyright and trademark, in-
tellectual property scholars have tended to be skeptical of overlapping 
protection schemes or a legal analysis that would appear to work an ex-
23. Indeed, it might be the case that the copyright owner bringing the original copy-
right claim (e.g., a publisher) is asserting attributional interests that are not in fact its own 
and so may well (and quite correctly) have no trademark-type claim to bring at all. Thanks 
to Dave Fagundes for encouraging me to clarify this point. 
24. Thanks to Fred Yen for helping to refine this point. As others have noted, atten-
tion must also be paid to assertions of trademark infringement built on slender reeds. See, 
e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF CoPYRIGHT 57, 96 n.49 (1967). 
25. Again, this is not to say that even when asserted under trademark law principles, 
such claims will, or should, always succeed; it is only to say that if they are asserted at all, 
they should be asserted under the correct legal doctrine. 
26. Bradford, supra note 11, at 740 ("By adding a copyright claim to what are essen-
tially trademark concerns, owners are able to sidestep trademark's broader free speech 
safeguards."). Indeed, because content owners of the type I describe are essentially seek-
ing to control the message of source conveyed with the communicative good, rather than 
the good itself, the use of copyright law to obtain an injunction against further dissemina-
tion of the work tends to look like an impermissible prior restraint. See, e.g., Mark A. 
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property 
Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147 (1998); Kozinski & Newman, supra note 11, at 516. 
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pansion of the limited term of copyright.27 And given the ways in which 
copyright holders often attempt to use copyright law to restrict the speech 
of others that is critical of the copyright holder's work,Z8 this skepticism is 
understandable and warranted. Intellectual property law of any stripe 
should not be used to, as Wendy Gordon has described it, "impermissibly 
inhibit others from turning the original works to their own aesthetic, cul-
tural and political advantage."29 But the current state of copyright law 
seems to foster this result more than it does discourage it. 
The goal of this Article is not to argue for trademark or intellectual 
property expansionism as such; as noted, any recognition given to a more 
robust attributional right in trademark's realm must be cabined by at 
least the limitations that would apply to other trademark law-based 
claims. Nor am I challenging the belief that a rich public domain spurs 
creativity or in any way suggesting that more raw materials should be 
propertized. To the contrary, I am seeking a way to preserve the core of 
the public domain-the ability to use the materials in question in the pro-
duction of other works-in light of an ever-expanding copyright law. In 
short, I am suggesting that the solution to overreaching copyright law al-
27. See, e.g., Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the 
Close Association Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89, 92 (1989) ("[N]either the copy-
right nor the trademark system should allow the creator of a useful or ornamental idea to 
earn monopoly profits since protection under these systems is easier to obtain and has a 
longer life."); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of 
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1476 (2004) 
(contending that "the availability of overlapping intellectual property protection in all of 
its forms presents a serious threat to the goals and purposes of federal intellectual property 
policy"). But see KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 50 (noting, in admittedly something of an 
aside, that a later author that gave his characters the same name as those in Twelfth Night 
might be engaged in "passing off'); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A 
Technological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IowA L. REv. 611, 627 (1999) ("As a gen-
eral rule ... cumulative legal causes of action to sustain different interests or to secure 
different relief are not regarded as inherently objectionable."); Doris Estelle Long, First, 
"Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawyers!": Musings on the Decline and Fall of the 
Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 851, 891 (2001) ("[Hostility to intel-
lectual property rights] ignores the different nature of each form of intellectual property: 
each form was created to protect a particular aspect of intellectual productivity."). Addi-
tionally, A. Samuel Oddi writes: 
The expiration of one of the federal titles of protection cannot drag another 
extant title into the public domain. If a general rule is suggested, it would be 
that the public may exploit any creation in the public domain provided there 
is no extant form of protection that would otherwise preclude this 
exploitation. 
A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25 
HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 48 (2002); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegel-
man, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1502-03 
(2002) (contending that the "Supreme Court's hostility to leveraged patents [through 
trademark law] is ill-conceived" because "[a]ny diminution in the scope of trademark pro-
tection available to patentees increases the relative value of their patent monopoly, and 
correspondingly, forces them to rely on monopolistic rents to recover their investment in 
R&D"). 
28. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
29. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1536 (1993). 
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ready exists; it simply exists outside of copyright law itself.3° 
Part II sets the stage for my proposal by illustrating the fundamental 
differences between copyright law and trademark law-in their incen-
tives, their goals, and their range of remedies. It then goes on to trace the 
jurisprudence at the other intellectual property interfaces, in which courts 
have recognized distinctions they seem unwilling to recognize at the 
trademark/copyright interface. Part III considers issues relating to (and 
possible objections to) my proposal posed by conceptions of the public 
domain and proposes a different reading of the public domain that is 
more consonant with the nature of the copyright term that precedes it. 
Part IV sets forth the proposal: a recognition of the attribution interest in 
communicative goods during both the term of copyright and in the public 
domain, coupled with greater scrutiny of trademark-based claims mas-
querading as copyright-based ones. In essence, I suggest that courts 
should pay more attention when content owners attempt to use an over-
broad notion of copyright law to assert trademark-based claims and re-
strict assertion of copyright claims to those instances in which such 
owners are seeking to vindicate copyright interests. Thus, where the con-
tent owner is not seeking to prevent competitive use of the work but is 
really seeking attribution or disassociation, courts should allow them to 
do so, but only through something akin to trademark law (and, indeed, 
should view the use of copyright law in such circumstances as a form of 
copyright misuse). Next, I contend that because this construct should ap-
ply even when the copyright term ends for a work, courts should pay 
more attention when defendant content users attempt to use an over-
broad notion of the public domain to blunt these trademark-type claims. 
Copyright law and trademark law are different regimes, with different 
motivations and different remedies, and there should be no reason why a 
properly stated trademark law-based claim should have to fall by the 
wayside simply because no valid copyright claim exists. 
II. THE TRADEMARK/COPYRIGHT INTERFACE 
Before considering how copyright law and trademark law came to be 
seen as duplicative schemes, it might be helpful to reinforce the separate 
economic foundations underlying each. From there, we can consider how 
similar distinctions have been recognized at other intellectual property 
law interfaces and why the line is considerably blurrier at the trademark/ 
copyright interface. 
30. David Lange, who is supportive of a robust public domain, once argued along 
similar lines. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PRoss. 147, 177 (1981) ("[T]here can be little damage to the public domain in requiring 
precautions designed to prevent genuine deception or confusion ... . "). In this regard, my 
proposal is more modest than it might appear at first glance. My goal is merely to propose 
an additional (and existing) tool that might usefully deal with the concerns raised by an 
expansive copyright law and to suggest that the prevailing view of the copyright/trademark 
intersection has obscured this tool's availability. 
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A. THE GoALS OF CoPYRIGHT LAw AND TRADEMARK LAw 
Although both are today typically explained in terms of economics, 
U.S. copyright law and trademark law are motivated by different con-
cerns and, therefore, are directed toward different goals.31 Copyright's 
economic story is one of incentives.32 In this (the most dominant) telling, 
the rights provided by copyright law are necessary in order to induce the 
appropriate amount of creative products; without these incentives, cre-
ators would presumably underproduce.33 In this regard, copyright law is 
aligned with patent law: both embody a set of rights used to induce cre-
ators and inventors to share their work with the public by granting a lim-
ited period of time during which the creator or inventor can exact 
monopoly prices.34 
The set of rights copyright law offers creators all relate to exploitation 
of the work.35 Assuming the work clears the constitutional hurdles of 
originality and fixation, the copyright owner enjoys for the statutory pe-
riod the exclusive right to control the reproduction, distribution, public 
performance, and display of the work, in addition to control over whether 
any derivative works are created.36 Each of these rights relates to the use 
of the work itself and, in particular, the exploitation of the work in its 
various forms. 37 Essentially, the nature of the incentive tells creators, 
31. Compare Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (citing artists' testi-
mony before Congress to the effect that "the copyright system's assurance of fair compen-
sation for themselves and their heirs was an incentive to create"), with Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (stating that the Lanham Act "broadly prohibits 
uses of trademarks . . . that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product or 
service"), superseded by Trademark Dilution Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 
1730. 
32. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1610-12 
(1982). But see, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic 
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1945, 1946 (2006) (challenging 
this view as neglecting "inspirational or spiritual motivations for creativity"). Other justifi-
cations-a Lockean theory of deserts or a sense of moral rights-have been proffered but 
have not won overwhelming favor in U.S. jurisprudence or scholarship. See, e.g., John 
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 139 (1991). 
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 n.15. 
34. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine 
of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY 
TEcH. L.J. 865, 876 n.32 (2000) ("Both (patent and copyright law] represent a legislatively 
determined trade-off between increased ex ante incentives for investment and reduced ex 
post utilization through an exclusive property right, where in a rough sense, it is accepted 
that the social benefits of increased supply exceed the social costs of short term inefficient 
use."). 
35. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2006). I am excluding from this discussion the rights pro-
vided by 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A. 
36. /d. 
37. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1449, 1452 (1997) 
("Copyright is a commercial doctrine; the reasonable commercial expectations of the origi-
nal author needed to be protected from one who would quote in order to compete by 
offering a substitute for the original."). It may be useful to note that the Statute of Anne 
(U.S. copyright law's ancestor) granted exclusive rights only in the "printing and re-
printing" of a book, with infringement being the act of "print(ing], reprint[ing], or im-
port[ing]" without consent. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 7. Other commentators have 
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much as it does in the patent scheme, "The world will be a better place 
for your creations. If you bring them forth, we will give you, for a limited 
time period, the exclusive right to profit from them." Infringement, too, 
is explained largely in terms of these market-based rights: infringement, 
put simply, is use of the copyrighted work during the copyright term in 
violation of one of these rights.38 In other words, infringement is an at-
tempt by the infringer to appropriate for himself the economic due that is 
the author's,39 rendering the infringer potentially subject to payment of 
damages and/or an injunction.40 
Copyright law does, of course, provide a significant exception to this 
general principle in the form of a "fair use" provision, in which parties 
who are engaging in transformative (as opposed to substitutive) use of 
the work, such as commentary or criticism, are deemed not to have com-
mitted infringement even though such use has not been authorized by the 
copyright holder.41 Here, too, the analysis is driven largely by whether 
the defendant's use is a substitute in the marketplace for the plaintiff's 
work.42 The focus on this question makes sense given the economic na-
ture of the rights granted to the copyright holder: If the rights are largely 
about the exclusive ability of the copyright holder to monetize the work 
at issue, a concurrent, unauthorized use of the work by another party 
during the copyright term can be permissible only if it doesn't compete 
with the copyright owner's work in the market.43 
Thus, despite the pervasive trope of the Romantic author throughout 
copyright law commentary-a view that has never quite accurately de-
scribed authorship vis-a-vis copyright law in any event44-it would seem 
to be the dominant view that market-based interests (rather than moral 
asserted noneconomic justifications for copyright. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Pre-
serving Personal and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: 
A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 151, 170 (2001). 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
39. /d.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 
(1984) (describing an infringer as "anyone who trespasses into [the copyright owner's] ex-
clusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the ... 
ways set forth in the statute"); Yen, supra note 21, at 674 ("Copyright exists to provide 
economic incentives for the production of creative works, and copyright plaintiffs generally 
sue to keep the defendant from appropriating or destroying revenue streams the plaintiff 
would otherwise enjoy from the sale or other exploitation of the plaintiff's work.") (foot-
note omitted). 
40. 17 u.s.c. §§ 502-505. 
41. /d. § 107. 
42. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-93 (1994); Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985); Gordon, supra note 32, 
at 1639-40. 
43. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It is plain that where 
a use has no demonstrable impact on a copyright owner['s] potential market, the use need 
not be prohibited to protect the artist's incentive to pursue his inventive skills."); KAPLAN, 
supra note 24, at 53 (suggesting that "cross-lifting among serious musical works" should be 
permitted under copyright Jaw because of, inter alia, "the unlikelihood that borrowing di-
verts profit from the original composer"). 
44. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudo-
nymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1384-94 (2005) (describing 
conceptions of authorship). 
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or personality interests) are what are at the heart of U.S. copyright law. 
Copyright law, in other words, appeals to creators' interest in monetizing 
their cultural production by offering them certain exclusive rights to do so 
for a limited time.45 
Although it also can be explained in economic terms, trademark law, 
by contrast, has historically not been justified in terms of promoting crea-
tivity.46 Unlike copyright and patent law, trademark law is not designed 
to offer the trademark holder incentives to create; indeed, the prevailing 
view (but probably not among marketers) is that virtually no creativity at 
all is required to develop a trademark.47 Rather, trademark law is typi-
cally justified in terms of the public interest-protecting consumers from 
deception in the marketplace by prohibiting the use of source-identifying 
marks if such use is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the 
product. In economic parlance, the protection of trademarks both "re-
duce[ s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing deci-
sions" by allowing the consumer to easily find (or avoid) the product he 
used last time and "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated 
with a desirable product. "48 An entity that uses another's valid trade-
mark in a way that evidences a likelihood of confusion among the rele-
vant consumer market is deemed to have infringed that trademark.49 
Although trademark infringement cases typically involve what the av-
erage member of the public would think of as a trademark (a word, a 
logo, or a slogan), the unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act 
45. In Eldred, in which the Court held valid the Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998, the Court quoted with approval the statement in American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., that "copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive 
to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting 
in the proliferation of knowledge." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (quot-
ing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 60 
F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)). Of course, there is much creation subject to copyright that is not 
motivated by the possibility of profit-some scholarly writing, many of the user-created 
videos on sites like YouTube, and no doubt a large number of existing blogs. Indeed, for 
these creators the sole interest they may have in their creation is the non-copyright interest 
in attribution for their efforts. 
46. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
47. See, e.g., id. ("The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or 
discovery ... . The trade-mark does not depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any 
work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It 
is simply founded on priority of appropriation."); Dinwoodie, supra note 27, at 630. Not all 
scholars agree with this assessment. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, 
at 1472 ("(T]he insistence [by the Supreme Court] on viewing copyright, patent, and trade-
marks as protecting distinct social goals-a position shared by many Law and Economics 
scholars-is in many cases simply wrong. As we will show, trademark protection also spurs 
innovation and can complement the incentive provided by patents to expend resources on 
R&D."). 
48. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted); see also, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and 
Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REv. 2099, 2105-07 (2004). 
49. U.S. trademark also provides a cause of action for dilution of a famous mark, see 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 2006), but I have focused on that cause of action elsewhere. 
See Heymann, supra note 11 (manuscript at 15, available at http:l/ssrn.com/abstract= 
907713). 
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are not so limited nor are they limited to protection of things registered 
as trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act permits a cause of action against any per-
son who, "in connection with any goods or services," uses any "word, 
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact" that is likely to cause confusion as to 
the "affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person" or as to the "origin, sponsorship, or approval" of his goods or 
services.50 Because this is considerably broad language, courts have rec-
ognized trademark-like interests in elements such as the distinctive sound 
of a singer's voice and a famous author's name. 5 1 In such cases, the plain-
tiff's claim is not that the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark to con-
fuse consumers into thinking that the defendant's products are made by 
the plaintiff (as would, say, the maker of "Popsi Cola") but rather that the 
defendant is using some distinctive (and source-identifying) aspect of the 
plaintiff himself in order to deceptively suggest to consumers that the 
plaintiff has some connection with the defendant or the defendant's prod-
ucts (that is, a sponsorship or authorization).52 
Thus (and this is something of an oversimplification), while copyright 
law gives the right holder the ability to control distribution of the work 
itself, trademark law, properly enforced, gives the right holder the ability 
to control the manner in which that work is presented to the public and, 
specifically, the ability to attempt to control the association consumers 
make when they encounter the mark.53 Because the two regimes are mo-
tivated by different concerns and are aimed at different goals, there 
should be no doctrinal reason why a plaintiff couldn't enforce both claims 
concurrently or separately, as appropriate. 54 Yet many scholars appear to 
be resistant to this concept for reasons that don't seem to arise in consid-
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
51. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1992) (singer's 
voice); King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1992) (author's name). 
52. Indeed, until the Court's 2003 decision in Dastar, courts were willing to consider a 
cause of action under section 43(a) for failure to attribute source in connection with com-
municative goods although many, if not most, of these cases involved misattribution rather 
than simply a complete lack of attribution. See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, 
Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1994); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603-07 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
53. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 106, with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). 
54. The Supreme Court has often noted that copyright law and trademark law serve 
distinct goals. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,439 n.19 
(1984) (noting that the Court has "consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kin-
ship exists between copyright law and trademark law" as exists between copyright law and 
patent law); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting 
that the rights available under trademark law bear "little or no analogy" to those available 
under copyright or patent law); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1879); McLean v. 
Fleming, 96 U.S 245, 254 (1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 322 (1872); see 
also, e.g., EFS Mkt'g, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he 
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act address different harms. The first follows from a lack 
of originality, the second from a likelihood of confusion.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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eration of other areas of the law in which there are overlapping rights.55 
A tract of real property, for example, can be protected both by the law of 
trespass and by the law of nuisance, and no one would suggest that the 
landowner must choose one legal scheme to the exclusion of the other. 
In intellectual property, by contrast, an "information wants to be free" 
trope is more pervasive, such that any restrictions on the use of creative 
material beyond those provided by copyright are seen as "additional" and 
therefore improper. 
This discomfort seems to be limited to, or at least focused on, commu-
nicative goods-in other words, at the trademark/copyright interface as 
opposed to other intersections in intellectual property law. At both the 
patent/trademark interface and at the patent/copyright interface, by con-
trast, the courts seem more solicitous of the coexistence of both intellec-
tual property schemes, based on the same kind of distinction among goals 
and remedies that I have just discussed here. 
B. THE PATENT/TRADEMARK INTERFACE 
The Dastar Court's conclusion that it is trademark law, and not copy-
right law, that must give way when the two are in apparent conflict was 
based on a series of patent cases that, as the Court described them, evince 
the Court's efforts to be "careful to caution against misuse or over-exten-
sion of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occu-
pied by patent or copyright."56 But a review of these opinions (which fall 
entirely into the patent realm) shows that, almost uniformly, the Court 
was careful to leave some room for trademark law-related interests in 
fields largely occupied by patent-specifically, it imposed on the entity 
practicing the now patent-free invention an obligation to provide 
whatever disclaimers or disclosures were necessary to eliminate consumer 
confusion. 
In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., the Court held 
that a company that had copied the plaintiff's sewing machine after the 
patent on it had expired had the right not only to copy the machine but 
55. See supra note 27. But see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?: Copyright and 
Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 338, 371 (1992) ("[T]he federal trademarks law affords protection not against copying 
per se, but against falsehoods in the marketplace. As a result, the protection afforded 
under the Lanham Act is not substantively equivalent to copyright or patent protection."); 
Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 605, 623 
(2000) (suggesting that Congress could enact database legislation under the Commerce 
Clause so long as the legislation did not "create copyright rights in information"). Yochai 
Benkler, who is a strong proponent of an expansive public domain, has also recognized this 
distinction, although he characterizes it as a concern subordinate to copyright law rather 
than a co-equal regulatory scheme. See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice 
and the Constitutional Foundation of the Public Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoss. 173, 
178 (2003) ("While Congress may regulate information markets under the Commerce 
Clause, it may not do so by creating exclusive private rights in information in a way that 
circumvents the substantive limitations placed on its power by [Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the Constitution]."). 
56. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003). 
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also to call the machine a "Singer," given that the word had, over time, 
become the generic term for that type of sewing machine.57 (To the ex-
tent that the Court determined that "Singer" was a generic term and not 
a trademark, its conclusion that makers of similar machines could call 
their products by that name is uncontroversial.)58 Nevertheless, it was 
still incumbent upon the defendant and others in similar situations, the 
Court held, to avoid creating any consumer confusion in the marketplace 
that might result from its lawful exercise of its public domain rights under 
the expired patent: 
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly 
created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly 
covered by the patent becomes public property .... It equally follows 
from the cessation of the monopoly and the falling of the patented 
device into the domain of things public, that along with the public 
ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the public 
the generic designation for the thing which has arisen during the mo-
nopoly .... But it does not follow, as a consequence of a dedication, 
that the general power, vested in the public, to make the machine 
and use the name imports that there is no duty imposed, on the one 
using it, to adopt such precautions as will protect the property of 
others and prevent injury to the public interest, if by doing so no 
substantial restriction is imposed on the right of freedom of use. This 
principle is elementary and applies to every form of right, and is gen-
erally expressed by the aphorism sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas. 
This qualification results from the same principle upon which the 
dedication rests, that is, a regard for the interest of the public and the 
rights of individuals.s9 
Thus, the Singer Court recognized that patent law and trademark law re-
spond to two distinct interests: the interest in monopoly over production 
and use (and similarly, in copyright, the interest in monopoly over crea-
tion and distribution) and the interest in preserving source attribution or, 
at the very least, minimizing consumer confusion. And, as the Court 
noted, the public interest is concerned with both: with the use that results 
once the limited monopoly of patent or copyright expires and with a mar-
ketplace free of confusion as to source. 
Similarly, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., the Court held that 
after the patent on shredded wheat expired, the former patent holder 
could not prevent the defendant from making the product and from call-
ing it by the now generic name "shredded wheat," but the plaintiff could 
exercise its right to stop the defendant from confusing consumers as to 
the source of its product (or, more particul~rly, to require the defendant 
to specifically identify its own product).60 
57. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
58. ld. at 180-81. 
59. /d. at 185-86. 
60. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'! Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-21 (1938). Indeed, the Court 
noted that the defendant was under such an obligation no fewer than four separate times in 
its opinion. See also id. at 121 (describing the defendant's obligation as being to "use every 
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Other cases follow a similar theme. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co. 61 and its companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 
Inc.,62 the Court rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to use state unfair com-
petition law to prevent the defendants in each case from copying the 
plaintiffs' formerly patented designs and selling those designs in the mar-
ketplace.63 As the Court noted in Sears, the federal patent scheme in-
volves a tradeoff between the limited monopoly over production and use 
given to the patent owner and the ability to practice once the patent ex-
pires: "[W]hen the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, 
and the right to make the article-including the right to make it in pre-
cisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public."64 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded, a state could not create additional patent 
rights that would be invoked post-expiration without coming into conflict 
with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.65 But the Court's lan-
guage was targeted only at alternative statutory schemes (in this case, 
state unfair competition law) that created a shadow patent scheme.66 The 
Court took pains to note that state unfair competition law could be in-
voked to enforce trademark- or unfair competition-based rights, so long 
as the requirements of that law were met: 
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that 
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other pre-
cautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as 
to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their 
trademark, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as 
to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading pur-
chasers as to the source of the goods. But because of the federal 
patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and un-
copyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award dam-
ages for such copying. 67 
The Court made much the same point in Compco: 
reasonable means to prevent confusion"). Graeme Dinwoodie has quite correctly charac-
terized this admonition from the Court as "an assessment of the manner in which the de-
fendant was exercising its right to copy . . . to determine congruence with principles of 
unfair competition." Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit 
Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 233 (Jane C. Gins-
burg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
61. 376 u.s. 225 (1964). 
62. 376 u.s. 234 (1964). 
63. In Sears, the item was a pole lamp, Sears, 376 U .S. at 225-26; in Compco, the item 
was a lighting fixture , Compco, 376 U .S. at 234. 
/d. 
64. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230 (citing Kellogg and Singer). 
65. /d. at 231. 
Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a 
patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal 
patents. To do either would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting 
patents only to true inventions, and then only for a limited time. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. at 232-33 (footnote omitted). 
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[W]hile the federal patent laws prevent a State from prohibiting the 
copying and selling of unpatented articles, they do not stand in the 
way of state law, statutory or decisional, which requires those who 
make and sell copies to take precautions to identify their products as 
their own. A State of course has power to impose liability upon 
those who, knowing that the public is relying upon an original manu-
facturer's reputation for quality and integrity, deceive the public by 
palming off their copies as the original. 68 
In other words, state unfair competition law may be invoked, even as to 
an article for which the patent has expired, to protect trademark-based 
rights involving source identification and labeling so long as the law is not 
used to create an extension of patent-law based rights (that is, the right to 
prevent use or sale of the item full-stop ).69 Thus, a putative plaintiff 
under these circumstances could not simply point to the existence of the 
defendant's identical article as proof of unfair competition; it would have 
to demonstrate that a likelihood of confusion as to source existed sepa-
rate and apart from the mere (and lawful) act of copying.7° 
Any question as to the correct reading of these cases was answered by 
the Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.: 
Read at their highest level of generality, [Sears and Compco] could 
be taken to stand for the proposition that the States are completely 
disabled from offering any form of protection to articles or processes 
which fall within the broad scope of patentable subject matter. ... 
That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from 
Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears it-
self . ... (O]ur decision in Sears clearly indicates that the States may 
place limited regulations on the circumstances in which such designs 
are used in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source. Thus, 
while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States 
68. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238; see also Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow 
of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REv. 595, 
611 (1996) ("By linking its holding directly to the Intellectual Property Clause, Compco 
recognized a constitutional foundation for the right to copy product configurations, with 
liability possible only if a defendant's labeling failed to eliminate the risk of confusion 
caused by its copying of distinctive nonfunctional elements of the plaintiff's design."). For 
a discussion about the parallels between consideration of federal intellectual property 
schemes and federal/state preclusion analysis, see Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in 
Copyright Law, 41 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 137, 167-68 (1993). 
69. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 ("[R]egardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts 
[as to secondary meaning] nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or 
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling."); cf id. at 239 (Harlan, J ., concurring) 
(stating that where the defendant copied with the dominant purpose of palming off, the 
plaintiff's remedy should include "reasonable restrictions" on the copying itself); see also 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) ("Where the 
public has paid the congressionally mandated price for disclosure, the States may not 
render the exchange fruitless by offering patent-like protection to the subject matter of the 
expired patent.") (emphasis added). 
70. In Bonito Boats, the Court characterized the appellate court's decision affirming 
the district court's injunction as "coming to the conclusion that the Illinois law of unfair 
competition prohibited product simulation even in the absence of evidence that the defen-
dant took some further action to induce confusion as to source." Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 
153. 
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may place some conditions on the use of trade dress indicates an 
implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable 
but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the 
federal patent laws.71 
71 
Thus, the Florida statute at issue in Bonito Boats, which prohibited the 
commercial use of a direct molding process to duplicate a manufactured 
vessel hull without authorization, was impermissible because, although it 
could be described as an "unfair competition" statute, its effect was not to 
protect consumers from deception by, for example, requiring accurate la-
beling or disclosures, but rather was to restrict the use of the article it-
self.72 The Florida statute did not contain any requirement that the vessel 
hull functioned as a source indicator or possessed secondary meaning, nor 
was the statute concerned with preventing consumer deception.73 In-
stead, it allowed the manufacturer to assert patent-like rights over the 
design even though that design had already been disclosed to the public 
and thus rendered unpatentable under federallaw.74 
Taken together, the Court's decisions at the patent/trademark interface 
indicate where the line is drawn: Neither federal nor state trademark or 
unfair competition law may provide patent-like rights for articles that 
cannot be patented under federal patent law-in other words, rights that 
grant the inventor the ability to prohibit use or sale of the article itself-
but they may certainly provide trademark-like rights for those same un-
patentable articles-rights that do not restrict use per se but do place 
some limitations on the way that use is presented to the public.75 So long 
as the purportedly competing statutory scheme promotes goals that are 
different from those promoted by the federal patent system, both 
schemes can peacefully co-exist.76 As the Court noted in Bonito Boats: 
71. /d. at 154; see also id. at 165 ("States may place limited regulations on the use of 
unpatented designs in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source."). 
72. /d. at 157-58. 
73. /d. at 158 ("In contrast to the operation of unfair competition law, the Florida 
statute is aimed directly at preventing the exploitation of the design and utilitarian concep-
tions embodied in the product itself."). Respectfully, I find this reading of the Court's 
holding in Bonito Boats to be less controversial than do other commentators. See, e.g., 
Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 364-65. 
74. /d. 
75. The Court has engaged in a similar discussion regarding preemption of state intel-
lectual property schemes by federal law. Cf Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 
470, 493 (1974) ("[State t]rade secret law and [federal] patent law have co-existed in this 
country for over one hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation 
of one does not take away from the need for the other."); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 
546 (1973); see also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring): 
/d. 
[T]he question presented in this case is whether Congress, in enacting the 
patent laws, intended merely to offer inventors a limited monopoly in ex-
change for disclosure of their invention or instead to exert pressure on inven-
tors to enter into this exchange by withdrawing any alternative possibility of 
legal protection for their inventions. I am persuaded that the former is the 
case. 
76. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166 (noting that in Sears and Kewanee, "state protec-
tion was not aimed exclusively at the promotion of invention itself, and the state restric-
tions on the use of unpatented ideas were limited to those necessary to promote goals 
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"(T]he law of unfair competition ... (has] coexisted harmoniously with 
federal patent protection for almost 200 years, and Congress has given no 
indication that [its] operation is inconsistent with the operation of the 
federal patent laws."77 
These general statements as to the interaction between patent law and 
trademark law have been given practical effect by the lower courts. In In 
re Mogen David Wine Corp., to take just one example, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the Federal Circuit) held 
that the manufacturer of a distinctive wine bottle could assert trademark 
rights in the bottle even though it also held a design patent in the bottle.78 
In holding that the manufacturer was not required to assert rights only 
under one scheme or the other, the court rejected the argument that the 
potentially perpetual nature of trademark rights might improperly extend 
the patent monopoly: 
In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair 
competition, which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a 
design patent, do not "extend" the patent monopoly. They exist in-
dependently of it, under different law and for different reasons. The 
termination of either has no legal effect on the continuance of the 
other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The trademark 
rights do not extend it. . .. Patent expiration is nothing more than the 
cessation of the patentee's right to exclude held under the patent 
law. Conversely, trademark conceivably could end through non use 
during the life of a patent. We doubt it would be argued that the 
patent rights should also expire so as not to "extend" them.79 
Similarly, in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
argument that to allow trademark protection for product configurations 
would contravene the limitations inherent in the Patent Clause: 
Compared to patent protection, trademark protection is relatively 
weak because it precludes competitors only from using marks that 
are likely to confuse or deceive the public . . . (W]hile a patent cre-
ates a type of monopoly pricing power by giving the patentee the 
exclusive right to make and sell the innovation, a trademark gives 
the owner only the right to preclude others from using the mark 
when such use is likely to cause confusion or to deceive. . . . 
[P]erpetual trademark protection under the Lanham Act for a prod-
uct configuration or design is not the equivalent of impermissible 
perpetual patent protection.80 
outside the contemplation of the federal patent scheme"); see also, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, 
The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111, 125-26 (2005). 
77. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166. 
78. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930-32 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
79. Id. at 930. 
80. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637-44 (7th Cir. 1993). The Supreme 
Court's subsequent decision in Wa/-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. , 529 U.S. 205 (2000), 
which held that product designs could not be protected as trademarks without a showing of 
secondary meaning, does not render the conclusion of the Kohler court incorrect; Samara 
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Thus, building on the Court's guidance in the cases just outlined, the 
lower courts have more explicitly concluded that the enforcement of 
rights based in trademark law is independent of the enforcement of rights 
under patent law,81 just as the enforcement of, say, emission standards as 
to a particular automobile is independent of efforts to enforce the com-
mon law of theft as to that same vehicle. 
As in copyright, patent law involves a certain quid pro quo: the disclo-
sure of the invention to the public in exchange for a limited monopoly 
during the term of the grant.82 One important bulwark at the trademark/ 
patent interface that derives from this exchange is the functionality doc-
trine. Under this doctrine, a defendant is free to copy functional features 
of an item no longer under patent even if those features became source 
identifiers during the term of the patent.83 To take one well-known judi-
cial example, once the patent on a spring mechanism for road signs ex-
pired, competitors could freely copy that design even if the exclusive use 
enjoyed by the patentee during the term resulted in the development of 
secondary meaning.84 The theory behind the doctrine is that features 
that are functional in nature may be copied freely post-patent term be-
cause it is precisely those features that were the subject of the patent in 
the first place.85 The bargain inherent in patent law requires this result; if 
competitors could not use the very elements of the item that make the 
item work, then they essentially cannot use the item at all, rendering the 
public domain on the other side of the patent term ephemeral.86 But 
even here, the courts have been careful to note that a competitor cannot 
use any nonfunctional elements that indicate the source of the original 
creator if to do so would sow consumer confusion;87 moreover, even the 
use of the functional aspects of the invention may, in limited instances, be 
required to be accompanied with a disclaimer or other method of dispel-
Bros. merely requires evidence of trademark status for product designs, rather than assum-
ing it. 
81. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobilie E Corse v. Roberts, 944 
F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[T)rademark protection does not unduly extend the sev-
enteen-year monopoly guaranteed by the patent laws because the two sources of protec-
tion are totally separate .... Thus, Lanham Act protection is available to designs which 
also might have been covered by design patents as long as the designs have acquired secon-
dary meaning."); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) 
("The trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection, it is true, but in an infringe-
ment suit must also prove secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion, which the owner 
of a design patent need not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency between the 
two modes of protection."); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 
(8th Cir. 1976) ("The protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair competition 
is greater than that accorded by the law of patents because each is directed at a different 
purpose. The latter protects inventive activity which, after a term of years, is dedicated to 
the public domain. The former protects commercial activity which, in our society, is essen-
tially private . ... Free competition is served in both cases."). 
82. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2), (d) (West 2006). 
83. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). 
84. Id. at 29-30. 
85. /d. 
86. ld. 
87. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). 
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ling any false intimation of association or sponsorship.88 Thus, the func-
tionality doctrine does its own work at policing the trademark/patent 
divide: It does not prohibit the second user from making use of the very 
thing guaranteed to him under the patent laws but rather places restric-
tions only on the way that use is presented to the public. 
C. THE COPYRIGHT/PATENT INTERFACE 
Much the same analysis is seen at the copyright/patent interface, de-
spite the fact that copyright and patent, as two regimes designed to en-
courage creative production in exchange for eventual ceding to the public 
domain, might be seen as closer to overlapping. Nevertheless, as the Su-
preme Court noted in Mazer v. Stein, "Neither the Copyright Statute nor 
any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copy-
righted. "89 Although Congress's power to enact both schemes derives 
from the same clause of the Constitution,90 and both are justified by the 
public interest in creativity or invention, patent and copyright address dif-
ferent aspects of the creative process: Patent protects the invention of a 
new idea, while copyright specifically does not protect the underlying 
idea but protects only a particular expression of that idea.91 Or, as the 
Mazer Court put it, "The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not 
beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original 
and ornamental design for design patents."92 
As at the trademark/patent interface, copyright law has a functionality 
doctrine that works to render unto copyright what is copyright's and unto 
patent what is patent's. Pursuant to this doctrine, any design that is "dic-
tated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it"93-
that is, a design that is more idea than expression-may not receive copy-
right protection (although it may, if it qualifies, be protected by patent). 
But the ornamental or design elements of an object that exist indepen-
dently of the functional aspects of the item may receive copyright protec-
tion,94 just as the source-identifying elements of a functional article that 
88. See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual 
Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 97, 
125-31 (2003); Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Mer-
chandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REv. 603, 614 n.69 (1984). 
89. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 
90. See U.S. CaNST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
I d. 
91. Compare 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2006), with 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2006). 
92. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218; see also, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880): 
The description of [a bookkeeping method] in a book, though entitled to the 
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art it-
self. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The 
former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can 
be secured at all, by letters-patent. 
93. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1302(4) (excluding from copyright protection a design "dictated 
solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it"). 
94. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101: 
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exist separately from the functional aspects may qualify for protection 
under the Lanham Act. Thus, in Mazer v. Stein, the Court held that the 
creator of a small china statuette of male and female dancing figures 
could maintain its copyright in the work even after the statuette had been 
used as the base for a table lamp.95 The two schemes, the Court con-
cluded, served different goals, such that the availability of protection 
under one could not preclude protection under the other: 
We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument 
that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copy-
right bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limi-
tation into the copyright law. Nor do we think the subsequent 
registration of a work of art published as an element in a manufac-
tured article is a misuse of the copyright. This is not different from 
the registration of a statuette and its later embodiment in an indus-
trial article.96 
The question of whether a creator could avail himself of both copyright 
protection and patent protection simultaneously did not directly arise in 
Mazer; because the creator had not in fact obtained a design patent, the 
issue in that case was whether the functional nature of the statuettes 
barred protection as a work of art under copyright.97 But the question 
did arise directly before the United States Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals twenty years later. In In re Yardley, the court relied on Mazer's 
foundational point to hold that the creator of a watch face design could 
indeed avail himself of the protections of both doctrines;98 any require-
ment that the creator elect one or the other, the court held, would be "in 
direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress" to provide both design 
patent protection and copyright protection, given that nothing in either 
statutory scheme requires a creator to choose.99 In particular, the Yar-
dley court rejected the Commissioner of Patents' argument (citing Sears) 
that to allow a creator to enjoy the protection of both copyright law and 
patent law for the same article would subvert Congress's goals in the pat-
ent scheme because when the patent expired, the invention would still be 
subject to the longer term of copyright, although no longer subject to the 
restrictions of patent law: 
The design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be iden-
tified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article. 
95. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. 
96. /d. at 218-19; see also Chosun Int'l Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 
328 (2d Cir. 2005). 
97. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 204-05. 
98. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
99. /d. at 1395 ("To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein: Neither the 
copyright statute nor the patent statute says that because a thing is copyrighted it may not 
be patented as a design. We should not so hold."). 
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We agree that the copyright secured by appellant's assignee will out-
live any design patent appellant may secure .... But the mere fact 
that the copyright will persist beyond the term of any design patent 
which may be granted does not provide a sound basis for rejecting 
appellant's design patent application .... If anything, the concurrent 
availability of both modes of securing exclusive rights aids in achiev-
ing the stated purpose of the constitutional provision.l00 
Given this seemingly uncontroversial line of cases at both the patent/ 
trademark interface and the patent/copyright interface holding that there 
is no fatal conflict between the two regimes in each pair, properly circum-
scribed, one might wonder whether a different result should necessarily 
obtain when the inquiry is at the trademark/copyright interface. The an-
swer, curiously, now seems to be yes. 
D. THE TRADEMARKICOPYRIGHT INTERFACE 
This was not always the case, however. For example, in Frederick 
Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that because the books at issue (several children's books by Beatrix 
Potter, including The Tale of Peter Rabbit) had fallen into the public do-
main, the defendant was free not only to republish the stories themselves 
but also to use the same cover illustrations as had been used for the plain-
tiff's series: 
The fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen into the 
public domain should not preclude protection under the trademark 
laws so long as it is shown to have acquired independent trademark 
significance, identifying in some way the source or sponsorship of the 
goods. Because the nature of the property right conferred by copy-
right is significantly different from that of trademark, trademark pro-
tection should be able to co-exist, and possibly to overlap, with 
copyright protection without posing preemption difficulties.101 
The same was true in Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. 
General Signal Corp., in which the plaintiff publisher of Consumer Re-
ports brought suit against the manufacturer of a vacuum cleaner that was 
favorably reviewed in the magazine; the manufacturer had included quo-
100. /d. at 1395-96 (rejecting the argument that permitting copyright protection to con-
tinue after the patent term ends effects a "failure of consideration"; "[a] patent is not a 
contract"). To be clear, my argument here is an attempt to engage in a reading of the 
existing statutory scheme, not to propose alternatives to it. Whether it was wise for Con-
gress to permit certain creators to avail themselves of both patent and copyright law, de-
spite the differing terms, is a discussion I leave to others. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark 
A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 27 
(2001) (noting the potential conflict between patent law and copyright law in the context of 
reverse engineering of software). 
101. Frederick Warne & Co. v. Books Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (citation omitted). See also Long, supra note 27, at 878 ("The right to such dual 
protection [in Frederick Warne] was premised on a clear acknowledgement that each arena 
of intellectual property law served its own special goals, and on the incongruity of limiting 
protection to works that were more creative."). 
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tations from the review in the manufacturer's television advertising.102 
The complaint alleged causes of action both under copyright law and 
under the Lanham Act.103 The Second Circuit held that the defendant's 
use of material from the review constituted fair use104 but that this find-
ing did not preclude consideration of the plaintiff's Lanham Act claim, 
which was assessed on its own merits.105 The court did not suggest, for 
example, that because the material used in the advertisement fell into the 
realm of material free from the restrictions of copyright law (in this case, 
because of the fair use finding), the Lanham Act could not apply because 
any restrictions from trademark law would impermissibly encroach on the 
rights guaranteed to the defendant as part of the copyright bargain. In-
deed, the court noted that the trademark-based claims were really what 
were at stake, stating, "CU is not really objecting to Regina's copying 
CU's expression. The statement of policy in its magazine and its position 
in its brief before us is that any mention of CU in commercial advertising 
will diminish its effectiveness as an unbiased evaluator of products."106 
Although it ultimately concluded that there was no likelihood of confu-
sion sufficient to support a preliminary injunction, the court further rec-
ognized the difference between copyright law and trademark law when it 
noted, in dicta, that had such a finding been made, the proper remedy 
would have been a disclaimer, not an injunction.107 This is entirely con-
sistent with a reasoned view of the separate spheres that copyright law 
and trademark law occupy: Copyright law controls distribution of the ma-
terial qua material; trademark law controls how the source of that mate-
rial is presented to the public.108 
This is not to say, however, that this view of the copyright/trademark 
interface has been universal. In Comedy III Products, Inc. v. New Line 
Cinema, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's attempt to 
102. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
103. /d. at 1047. 
104. The court concluded that the material copied, although used for commercial pur-
poses, was factual and informational, that the amount of material copied was "relatively 
insubstantial," and that the defendant's use did not compete in the market with the plain-
tiffs use. /d. at 1049-50. 
105. /d. at 1051. 
106. /d. at 1050 & n.7 ("Truthful excerpting of CU's ratings cannot hurt CU unless the 
public perceives that CU sponsored the use. In such a case§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act and 
the privacy statutes which prevent unauthorized product endorsements are more 
appropriate."). 
107. /d. at 1053 ("The First Amendment demands use of a disclaimer where there is a 
reasonable possibility that it will suffice to alleviate consumer confusion."). 
108. See, e.g., Brandir lnt'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148-49 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (rejecting a copyright claim as to a bicycle rack for failure to meet conceptual 
separability requirement but remanding for additional findings on the trademark law 
claim, noting that functionality in trademark doctrine differs); Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. 
Boorman, 130 F. 726, 728 (3d Cir. 1904) ("The complainant in this case is not seeking [by 
filing a trademark infringement case] to prevent the manufacture of baking powder by the 
defendant, but only to prevent him from using a mark or brand that would tend to induce 
purchasers to believe that defendant's article was really the manufacture and production of 
complainant."). 
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use the Lanham Act to restrain use of a clip from a Three Stooges movie 
that had fallen into the public domain; the clip played on a television in 
the background of a scene in the film The Long Kiss Goodnight.109 
While purporting to deny the plaintiff's claim on the ground that it had 
failed to show that the film clip functioned as the plaintiff's trademark,110 
the court made a much broader statement about the viability of Lanham 
Act claims post-expiration of copyright: 
[T]he footage at issue here was clearly covered by the Copyright Act, 
and the Lanham Act cannot be used to circumvent copyright law. If 
material covered by copyright law has passed into the public domain, 
it cannot then be protected by the Lanham Act without rendering 
the Copyright Act a nullity.ln 
Although the Supreme Court had previously considered the issues at 
the patent/trademark and patent/copyright interfaces, it had not paid 
much attention to whether the same considerations held true at the trade-
mark/copyright interface. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. presented that opportunity.l12 Twentieth-Century Fox, the holder 
of the exclusive television rights for Dwight D. Eisenhower's book about 
the Allied campaign in Europe during World War II, failed to retain 
rights in the television series eventually produced when it did not renew 
the copyright, leaving the television series in the public domain.113 Das-
tar, a producer of music CDs looking to capitalize on the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the end of World War II, acquired tapes of the series, edited them, 
and released the series as its own product, without any reference to the 
109. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2000). 
110. !d. at 595. Indeed, the court later noted that the plaintiff might well have main-
tained a viable claim if the defendant had "used the likeness of The Three Stooges on t-
shirts which it was selling." !d. at 596. 
111. !d. at 595. In my view, the court reached the correct result but for the incorrect 
reason. Comedy III should not have lost its suit because copyright law and trademark law 
are irreconcilable, and not even necessarily because the clip could not serve a trademark 
function; it should have lost because, as the court initially indicated, the use of the film clip 
for thirty seconds in the background of another film did not indicate sponsorship or au-
thorization (i.e., there was no likelihood of confusion). Cf. Clemens v. Belford, Clark & 
Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. III. 1883) (holding that a publisher was free to publish the works 
of Mark Twain that were in the public domain in any form it chose, including by (accu-
rately) stating the name of the author on the compilation); see also Kohler Co. v. Moen 
Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 639 n.9 (7th Cir. 1993): 
The [Clemens) court did not rule out trademark protection to the author's 
use of his pen name. Rather, the court simply held that because Twain had 
not obtained a copyright in his works, his writings had been dedicated to the 
public and anyone could publish them if they properly identified the writings 
as Twain's. Twain's trademark infringement claim was a loser because he did 
not (and could not) allege that the defendants had falsely identified the ori-
gin of the published works. There was minimal risk that the public would be 
confused as to the source because the defendants clearly identified Mark 
Twain as the author; Twain simply resented that the publisher would profit 
due to his failure to obtain copyright protection. 
112. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
113. !d. at 26. 
2007] The Trademark/Copyright Divide 79 
original series' producers.114 Dastar's offering competed with a reissue of 
the original Fox series (for which Fox had reacquired television rights in 
the book), and so Fox and its affiliates brought suit, alleging that the Das-
tar series infringed both the copyright in the book and Fox's rights under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.115 
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia,116 held that the 
Ninth Circuit erred by affirming the district court's award of summary 
judgment on the Lanham Act claim in favor of Fox.l17 Section 
43(a)(l)(A) of the Lanham Act, the provision under which Fox had as-
serted its claims, creates a cause of action against one who uses in com-
merce "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof," or "any false designation of origin," or a "false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" that is 
likely to cause confusion as to "the affiliation, connection, or association 
of such person with another person" or as to "the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person."118 Fox's allegation that Dastar had made a false representation 
as to the "origin" of the goods, the Court held, was unfounded: "Goods" 
in section 43(a)(l)(A) referred not to the intellectual property contained 
on the videotapes Dastar distributed but to the physical videotapes them-
selves, and Dastar was indisputably the source of the physical product.119 
The case therefore turned, in the Court's view, on a simple statutory anal-
ysis: the Lanham Act prohibits misleading statements in connection with 
the sale of "goods"; "goods" in this context refers to physical, not intel-
lectual, items; and Dastar made no false representation with respect to 
114. "Dastar's Campaigns series [was] slightly more than half as long as the original 
Crusade television series. Dastar substituted a new opening sequence, credit page, and 
final closing for those of the Crusade television series; inserted new chapter-title sequences 
and narrated chapter introductions; moved the 'recap' in the Crusade television series to 
the beginning and retitled it as a 'preview'; and removed references to and images of the 
book." /d. at 26-27. 
115. Fox's Lanham Act claim was brought as a "reverse passing off" claim, asserting a 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(a). /d. at 27 & n.l. Fox alleged, in essence, that Dastar 
violated the Lanham Act by misrepresenting that Dastar, rather than Fox, was the source 
of the television series. 
116. Justice Breyer, whose brother heard the case by designation at the appellate court 
level, did not participate in the case. 
117. /d. at 38. 
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a){l)(A) (West 2006). Section 1125(a)(1){B) prohibits the 
same activities in "commercial advertising or promotion" if they "misrepresent[ ] the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, 
services, or commercial activities." /d. § 1125(a)(l)(B). 
119. As the Court described: 
We think the most natural understanding of the "origin" of "goods"-the 
source of wares-is the producer of the tangible product sold in the market-
place, in this case the physical Campaigns videotape sold by Dastar .... [A]s 
used in the Lanham Act, the phrase "origin of goods" is in our view incapa-
ble of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communica-
tions that "goods" embody or contain. Such an extension would not only 
stretch the text, but it would be out of accord with the history and purpose of 
the Lanham Act and inconsistent with precedent. 
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32. 
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the source of origin of the physical item.12o 
But the Dastar Court went beyond this textual analysis to address more 
fundamental issues at the copyright/trademark interface. The possibility, 
the Court noted, that a trademark-based interest might even exist as to 
the intellectual property (as opposed to the physical vehicle) was 
unlikely: 
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically 
assume that the brand-name company is the same entity that came 
up with the idea for the product, or designed the product-and typi-
cally does not care whether it is. The words of the Lanham Act 
should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no con-
sequence to purchasers.121 
This was also the view of some commentators before the time of the Das-
tar opinion. Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, for example, 
suggested in 2002 that, for two reasons, there would be little need for a 
copyright owner to assert trademark rights in the same material because 
consumer interests would not be served thereby.122 First, they contended 
that consumers of communicative products aren't much concerned with 
source.123 Once material falls into the public domain, they argued, con-
sumers will refuse to pay more for authentic goods. Second, they as-
serted that consumers of copyrighted works are not repeat customers and 
so don't have the need for consistent use of trademarks that consumers of 
tangible goods do.t24 
Both of these contentions, it seems to me, are misaligned with how 
consumers experience communicative goods. A film buff is almost cer-
tainly willing to pay more for a video of a film titled M if he can be sure 
that he is getting Fritz Lang's 1931 classic and not the panned 1951 re-
make, and the reader who enjoys John Grisham novels and who wants to 
read more of them will almost certainly look for the "John Grisham" 
brand the next time she is at the bookstore.125 (Indeed, Parchomovsky 
and Siegelman ultimately concede that because "most copyrighted goods 
are experience goods, the purchasing decisions of consumers will, to some 
extent, be influenced by past consumption of other products of the same 
120. One commentator has suggested that the Court's reading of the statute can be 
interpreted fairly narrowly given that it focused only on the word "origin" and not on the 
statute's additional references to "sponsorship" or "approval." Rick Mortensen, D.l. Y. 
After Dastar: Protecting Creators' Moral Rights Through Creative Lawyering, Individual 
Contracts and Collectively Bargained Agreements, 8 V AND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 335, 342 
(2006). 
121. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32-33. 
122. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 1499-1500. 
123. /d. at 1499. 
124. /d. 
125. Heymann, supra note 44, at 1416-17. 
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brand."126) Similarly, buyers of Fox's and Dastar's products127 are very 
likely motivated not by the quality of the physical product when making 
purchasing decisions but by the quality of the creative product contained 
on the videotapes; it is for this reason that Fox's claim, properly inter-
preted, concerned Dastar's statement as to the source of origin for the 
intellectual property, whatever Fox's real motivation for bringing suit. As 
I have mentioned elsewhere, 128 consumers of the New York Times or the 
New York Post do not view those titles as indicating a source or origin for 
the newsprint-the physical good on which the newspaper is printed-
but rather use those titles as indications of the source of the intellectual 
property contained in those newspapers. 
The Dastar Court acknowledged that communicative products might 
function differently in this way, but ultimately concluded that revising its 
conclusion as to the scope of the statutory meaning of the word "goods" 
in the Lanham Act (or, as the Court put it, according "special treatment" 
to communicative products129) would create a conflict with copyright law: 
"The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has 
expired, like 'the right to make [an article whose patent has expired)-
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when pat-
ented-passes to the public.' "130 Thus, the Court concluded, where the 
goals of trademark law (preventing confusion as to source among con-
sumers) conflict with the goals of copyright law (granting the freedom to 
copy once material enters the public domain), trademark law must give 
way. 
Although it never says so directly, the Court's conclusion in this regard 
seems to proceed from a belief that, as between the two, copyright law 
enjoys a natural preeminence over trademark law. But why this is the 
case is not entirely clear. The Court does note that copyright law and 
trademark law have different goals and are motivated by different con-
cerns.131 Copyright law, as I noted earlier, is designed to induce creators 
to create; trademark law, by contrast, is designed to "'reduce[ ] the cus-
tomer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decision[s)" and to 
"help[ ] assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will 
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable 
product.' "132 But this difference in motivations does not alone suggest 
126. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 27, at 1500 ("For example, Blue Note, the 
famous jazz label, may rationally reduce the price of copyrighted recordings to entice jazz 
lovers to purchase the label's other recordings."). 
127. I use here the designation of the parties, fully aware that neither Fox nor Dastar, 
as corporate entity, was the actual creators of the material at issue. 
128. Heymann, supra note 44, at 1440-41. 
129. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). 
130. !d. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)) (empha-
sis added). The emphasized phrase appears to be the Court's addition in Dastar, it does 
not appear in the cases the Court cites for this principle. See supra text accompanying 
notes 57-74. 
131. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
132. /d. at 34 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 
(1995)). 
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that when the two are in conflict, copyright should prevail. Having ap-
parently reached this conclusion, however, the Court's remaining justifi-
cations follow naturally. First, because, like patent law, copyright law 
embodies a "carefully crafted bargain" in which, once the monopoly 
granted the copyright holder expires, the public may use the work "at will 
and without attribution,"133 limiting this right in any way through trade-
mark law would be inappropriate. This can be true, however, only if one 
assumes that copyright law's interests and trademark law's interests can-
not both be accommodated. Second, the Court noted, Congress created a 
limited attribution right in the form of the Visual Artists Rights of Act of 
1990, which provides that the author of an artistic work shall, in very 
limited circumstances, "have the right . . . to claim authorship of that 
work."134 Having created only this limited attributional right in the copy-
right law scheme, the Court concluded, Congress could not have intended 
the Lanham Act to provide additional attributional rights.135 But this ar-
gument seems to ignore the historical point that the United States, upon 
acceding to the Berne Convention in 1988, asserted that it need not enact 
new legislation to comply with the Convention's requirement that mem-
bers provide authors with attribution rights.l36 The U.S. took the posi-
tion that existing federal laws, including the Lanham Act, already 
afforded authors such protections.137 
Next, the Court turned to difficulties in implementation, noting, first, 
that even if "origin" under section 43(a) were applied with respect to 
communicative products, it would be difficult to determine to whom that 
definition should apply138 and, second, that even if this hurdle could be 
133. /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, it is unclear from where the Court 
derives its conclusion that the public domain encompasses not only the right to use the 
work but to do so without attribution. See Austin, supra note 76, at 126 ("[T]he premise 
that the public domain is good for the public does not lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that the public is also well served by misleading information about authorship being affixed 
to public domain material."). 
134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (West 2006). The attributional right is limited to 
"works of visual art," which must exist only in a single copy or in a "limited edition of 200 
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. " See id.; see 
also id. § 101. 
/d. 
135. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34-35: 
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the Jaw of copyright, 
it has done so with much more specificity than the Lanham Act's ambiguous 
use of "origin." ... Recognizing in §43(a) a cause of action for misrepresen-
tation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would 
render [VARA's] limitations superfluous. 
136. Austin, supra note 76, at 112-17. 
137. /d. 
138. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35-36. 
A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its copyright has expired, 
would presumably require attribution not just to MGM, but to Oscar Ham-
merstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film was based), to Georges 
Bizet (who wrote the opera on which the musical was based), and to Prosper 
Merimee (who wrote the novel on which the opera was based) . . .. We do not 
think the Lanham Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all 
its tributaries. 
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overcome, plaintiffs like Fox would resist application of the very remedy 
they ostensibly sought because, in the Court's view, they would not want 
any modifications of the work to be attributed to them and, indeed, might 
view such attribution as an equally false representation of authorization 
or sponsorship. These practical difficulties, while not insignificant, do not 
seem on their own to justify the Court's decision. Experience with situa-
tions such as orphan works139 demonstrates that many areas of intellec-
tual property law face hurdles in implementation relating to source 
identity issues, and there is no reason why the Lanham Act should stand 
alone in that regard. 
Ultimately, the consideration that seemed to most motivate the Court 
in Dastar is the idea that recognizing the application of trademark-type 
rights in areas where copyright may be the dominant form of protection 
leads to a "mutant" form of copyright law that impermissibly "limits the 
public's federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights"140 by en-
croaching upon the public domain. But, just as at the other intellectual 
property law interfaces, there seems to be nothing that particularly distin-
guishes the public domain in copyright law such that trademark law has 
no place there. 
III. TRADEMARK AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
A. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
The usual argument for why trademark law cannot have a place at the 
table post-copyright is because permitting such intrusion would restrict 
copyright's public domain. In this vision, the public domain is seen as 
something of a sacred and wholly inviolate realm, a source of raw mate-
rial for future creators that can be taken without restriction and without 
regard to any other legal regime. This view of the public domain is an 
attractive one and has much to commend it. Surely the world is a better 
place for West Side Story and the many other variations of Romeo and 
/d. 
Strangely, the Court seemed to think that this effort would be much easier when the 
work is copyrighted (as opposed to formerly copyrighted): "Without a copyrighted work as 
the basepoint, the word 'origin' has no discernable limits." /d. at 35. The Court did not 
indicate why the task of identifying the source of a work becomes more difficult the mo-
ment a work falls out of copyright. 
139. The Copyright Office's report on its approach to orphan works (works still under 
copyright but for which the copyright holder cannot be located easily or at all) is available 
at http://www.copyright.gov/orphanlorphan-report-full.pdf. Of particular note is that the 
Copyright Office has proposed that, so long as an accused infringer engaged in a "good-
faith, reasonably diligent search" to locate the copyright holder and, "throughout the 
course of the infringement, provided attribution to the author and copyright owner of the 
work, if possible and as appropriate under the circumstances," the remedies for the in-
fringement should be limited to reasonable compensation for use of the work and/or in-
junctive relief. UNITED STATES CoPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT oN ORPHAN WoRKS 127 
(2006). 
140. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34; see also Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribu-
tion, and Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22-23 (2005) (concluding that the Dastar Court was 
correct to leave regulation of source attribution for communicative products to norms 
rather than law). 
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Juliet that have followed, all of which could not have been created had 
Shakespeare's work not been in the public domain. And were we creat-
ing an intellectual property regime from whole cloth, we might want to 
affirmatively create a commons where users could be confident that ma-
terial drawn from that sphere could be used wholly without restriction 
from any source, "as free as the air to common use."141 But it's not at all 
clear that this is the intellectual property regime we now have. 
Although the term admits of many definitions,142 when courts and 
scholars talk about the "public domain" in copyright law they typically 
describe it as consisting of two elements: speech that can never be subject 
to copyright law (such as facts or ideas),143 and speech that was once 
subject to copyright law but for which the copyright term has expired.144 
The latter element is usually situated as part of the "copyright bargain" 
inherent in U.S. copyright law: The public is entitled to free use of mate-
rial in the public domain because it granted rights to the creator during 
the copyright term.145 The public domain, so described, constitutes con-
sideration in a contract between the public and the creator, wherein the 
public's consideration (in the form of the federal statutory scheme) gives 
the creator certain legal rights over her creation that allow her to restrict 
141. lnt'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 358-59 (1999). 
142. The fuzziness of the term, despite the longevity of the concept, has been a subject 
of note to many commentators. See, e.g., David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 463, 463 (2003) (calling the term "elastic and inexact"); Mark 
Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Pub-
lic Domain, 66 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 75, 85 (2003) ("The conclusion that one is forced 
to reach, then, is that in the early period in which modern copyright was forming in En-
gland, the legal discourse related to the public domain was feeble when compared to the 
strong arguments for authors' property rights."); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse 
on Public Domains, 55 DuKE L.J. 783 (2006) (considering the multiple definitions of "the 
public domain"). 
143. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 33, 39 (2003); cf Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access 
to materials already available."). 
144. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the 
Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DoMAIN 121, 124-32 (L. Guibault & P.B. 
Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (describing the development of the term). Some commentators 
would also include material that is currently subject to copyright but is free from copyright 
restrictions due to the particular use being made of the work (for example, fair use under 
17 U.S.C. § 107). See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 141, at 362. 
145. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214-15 (2003) (describing the bargain as 
exchanging the creation of the work for a monopoly lasting for the best available (that is, 
constantly updated) term). In Eldred, the Court made an attempt to distinguish copyright 
law from patent law, stating that its references to a "quid pro quo typically appear in the 
patent context," but the attempt is rather a secondary argument. /d. at 216. Thomas 
Nachbar has noted, however, that the construction of U.S. copyright law as a bargain may 
not be historically accurate. Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6 
GREEN BAG 37, 44 (2002) (noting that state copyright laws enacted contemporaneously 
with the Constitution mention authors' natural rights as much as the benefit to society as 
the justification for copyright protection). 
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the public's use of the work.146 
How, then, should we describe the creator's consideration-copyright's 
public domain? Most courts and commentators appear to conceptualize 
the creator's agreement as effecting an affirmative dedication of the ma-
terial to the public.147 The prevailing view of the public domain is that of 
a commons, where material is free for anyone to take and use without 
restriction.148 Restrictions on material thought to be in the public do-
main are seen as restrictions on creativity: A creator who has some limita-
tions on the "raw materials" he can use to create is thwarted in the 
creative process.149 Thus, even fair use rights that are built into the copy-
right statute can be seen as one aspect of the public domain in that they 
constitute a deliberately created realm in which copyright owners cannot 
assert copyright-based restrictions on use.l50 
Under this view, the public domain contains, and is built on, an inher-
ent "right to copy"151 that precludes other forms of regulation (or, at the 
146. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214-15. 
147. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 142, at 474 (arguing for consideration of the public 
domain as "a status independent and affirmatively recognized in law"); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 
73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 297, 356 (2004) (contending that the First Amendment generally 
requires a "mandatory speech commons"). 
148. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 141, at 360 ("Information is 'in the public domain' to 
the extent that no person has a right to exclude anyone else from using the specified infor-
mation in a particular way. In other words, information is in the public domain if all users 
are equally privileged to use it."); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 
975 (1990) (describing the public domain as "a true commons comprising elements of intel-
lectual property that are ineligible for private ownership" and that "may be mined by any 
member of the public"). The increase in communication and creation via the Internet has 
undoubtedly reinvigorated interest in a broad description of the public domain. See, e.g., 
Negativland, Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain, 66 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 
239, 249 (2003). 
149. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1570. But see, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 55, at 620 
(noting that some enclosure of information is consistent with the concept of the public 
domain); Samuels, supra note 68, at 182 (rejecting the argument that the "public domain" 
is a useful concept and contending that copyright law "has within it the limiting doctrines 
that protect the public interest"); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellec-
tual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 995, 997 (2003) (chal-
lenging the claim that "control will reduce the availability of information in the public 
domain"). 
150. See, e.g. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the 
Net, 47 DuKE L.J. 87, 105 (1997) ("(S]ince there is no 'natural' absolute intellectual prop-
erty right, the doctrines which favor consumers and other users, such as fair use, are just as 
much a part of the basic right as the entitlement of the author to prevent certain kinds of 
copying."). Whereas Boyle appears to characterize fair use as an oppositional right of the 
user, Justin Hughes characterizes it as establishing the boundary of the author's right. See 
Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertiziation, and 
Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL L. REv. 993, 1081 (2006) ("To put this in property parlance, 
section 107 fair use draws a border on the property rights granted under section 106. Eve-
rything on the fair use side is not just fair use, it is outside the property right."). 
151. Cf Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The 
right to copy is even more robust when the copied product was previously patented but the 
patent has expired. In that case, the original producer has reaped his reward of a 17-year 
monopoly and the public has already paid the congressionally mandated price for disclo-
sure.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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very least, other forms of intellectual property regulation).152 But it's not 
clear why this should be the choice over a conception that defines copy-
right's public domain as simply a state of "not-copyright"-in other 
words, an area in which copyright law has no truck, but other areas of the 
law, if applicable, can bear on use of the materiaP53 Surely the public 
domain cannot be a state of pure lawlessness; as Yochai Benkler sug-
gested along similar lines, if an avant-garde New York theatre company 
decides to put on a production of Romeo and Juliet using loudspeakers in 
the middle of Fifth Avenue at rush hour, it may be subject to laws regulat-
ing the flow of traffic or nuisance, and it cannot use the fact that the work 
is the public domain as a defense.154 Or, to take another example, one 
cannot pick up a copy of Romeo and Juliet from the local bookstore and 
walk out the front door without paying on the basis that the work is in the 
public domain and therefore free to the entire public.155 One final exam-
ple involves United Airlines, which currently uses George Gershwin's 
Rhapsody in Blue as the theme music for its television commercials. If 
United continues to do so after the song enters the public domain, 156 it 
152. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 27, at 716 ("More strategically, treating the right 
to copy as independent of the functionality doctrine permits advocates of minimalist cate-
gorical protection to set up design trade dress protection as antagonistic to the purposes of 
trademark law, rather than reflected within the body of trademark law, and thus posit a 
hierarchy of intellectual property regimes."). 
153. Language to this effect appears from time to time in judicial discourse, but it is 
unclear how deliberately it was intended. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
247-48 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing copyright's directive as both "creating 
incentive for authors to produce" and "removing the related restrictions on dissemination 
after expiration of a copyright's 'limited Time'"). In their discussion of "pliability rules" as 
applied to copyright, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky initially appear to adopt 
this formulation of the copyright bargain but ultimately describe the public domain more 
broadly. Compare Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MicH. L. 
REv. 1, 39 (2002) (describing copyright as a "zero order pliability rule" in which, upon 
expiration of the copyright term, "the initial entitlement owner loses the ability to exercise 
property rule protection ... over her property"), with id. at 42 (describing the 
postcopyright term as a time when "anyone can use, reproduce, and market [the works) 
freely"). 
As suggested in the text, I am talking here about copyright's public domain as tradition-
ally identified. Trademark law and patent law each have, of course, their own public do-
mains; the intersection of these three spheres might most cleanly correspond to the view of 
the "public domain" as a true commons. 
154. Benkler, supra note 141, at 362. 
155. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman characterizes this example as the producer's recover-
ing "the costs associated with the packaging of speech goods," the charge being "not for 
the content but its embodiment on paper." Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 368. This 
characterization, which is, of course, entirely correct, illustrates that forms of propertiza-
tion/monetization not concerned with copyright can coexist with copyright's public 
domain. 
156. Given the current length of the copyright term, the song will likely not pass into 
the public domain until2018, so this hypothetical is indeed such in that it assumes both that 
United Airlines will continue to use the same theme music in its advertising twelve years 
hence and that United Airlines will continue to exist twelve years hence. Of course, there 
are many other issues associated with United's "recoding" of the song, see Eldred, 537 U.S. 
at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the $500,000 that United Airlines has had to 
pay for the right to play George Gershwin's 1924 classic Rhapsody in Blue represents a 
cost of doing business, potentially reflected in the ticket prices of those who fly"); Justin 
Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEx. L. 
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would seem illogical that a new entrant into the airline services market 
could create confusion in the marketplace as to the source of its services 
by using the song as its advertising theme music and yet successfully de-
fend a suit by United on the ground that the song was now in the public 
domain and thus free from any legal restrictions on its use.157 Indeed, 
many types of creative endeavors free from copyright might be subject to 
other legal restrictions such as trade secret law or the right of publicity 
under current doctrine.158 So copyright's public domain doesn't quite 
mean free access to formerly copyrighted works; it means, I think, only 
that one cannot be sued for copyright infringement for making the kinds 
of use of the material that formerly belonged only to the copyright 
holder.159 To be sure, this choice between two visions of the public do-
main has considerable implications for the resulting view of unfair com-
petition's (or any other law's) application in the space, as those who take 
the former view are likely to see even a slightly more robust application 
of trademark law's attribution function as taking from the public some-
thing to which it was entitled.160 But this is true only if we conceive of 
REv. 923, 960 (1999), none of which I mean to discount by this discussion. My discussion 
here is intended only to reflect the current allocation of harms among the various intellec-
tual property schemes and not to suggest that the internal structure of each of those 
schemes (for example, the current length of the copyright term) is justified. 
157. I recognize that this example involves a separate entity-that is, one other than 
Gershwin-that has created source-identification meaning in the communicative product. 
For that reason, such entities may well have a much stronger trademark-based claim than 
would the creator of the communicative product itself. But this should follow from the 
application of unfair competition principles of source identification and consumer confu-
sion, not from the categorical exclusion of copyrighted (or formerly copyrighted) material 
from trademark law's realm. Perhaps an even clearer example, suggested to me by Robert 
Brauneis, is that of a copyrighted corporate logo: It would be bizarre to think that once the 
copyright on the logo expires, the company for which it serves as a trademark could no 
longer stop competitors from using the logo as a source identifier for their own products or 
services. 
158. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 318 (discussing "the number of times that 
the Court historically has approved direct or indirect commodification of speech goods 
using a vehicle other than copyright or patent law"). 
159. In the debate over the Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, the House's Com-
mittee Report used similar limiting language, albeit to the end of expanding copyright's 
hold over creative works: 
Upon the expiration of the copyright term, the work falls into the public 
domain. This means that anyone may perform the work, display the work, 
make copies of the work, distribute copies of the work, and create derivative 
works based on the work without first having to get authorization from the 
copyright holder. Essentially, the copyright holder no longer has the exclu-
sive ability to exploit the work to their financial gain and no longer 'owns' 
the work. 
H. REP. No. 105-452, § 5 (1998); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the 
Public Domain, 28 DAYTON L. REv. 215, 231 n.116 (2002): 
/d. 
While these statements may sound neutral, they were part of Congress' justi-
fication for enacting term extension and delaying the entry of such works 
into the public domain. In other words, allowing works to enter the public 
domain was something to be condemned, or at least only grudgingly toler-
ated, rather than something to be celebrated. 
160. See Benkler, supra note 141, at 362-63; Moffat, supra note 27, at 1517-18. But see 
Zimmerman, supra note 147, at 371 (noting that although material in the public domain 
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copyright's public domain as a limitless grant, free from any legal encum-
brance. This is not the case in the public domain of patent; it is not clear 
why it should be any more true in copyright's public domain. 
B. TRADEMARK LAW AS CIRCUMVENTION 
Another, albeit far more secondary, basis given for why trademark law 
should not be viable during the copyright term or during the term of cop-
yright's public domain is the concern that permitting such a cause of ac-
tion would allow content owners to circumvent well-reasoned restrictions 
on the scope of trademark law. In Dastar, for example, the Court cited 
three cases-Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,161 in which the 
Court held that product design cannot be protected under the Lanham 
Act without a showing of secondary meaning; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thun-
der Craft Boats, Inc., 162 in which the Court rejected Florida's attempt to 
create a cause of action for unauthorized copying of unpatented boat hull 
molds; and TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,163 in which 
the Court held that a maker of road sign stands whose patent had expired 
could not assert a Lanham Act claim against a competitor who copied the 
functional aspects of the stand design in making its own version of the 
stand after the patent expired-as cases whose results would have been 
eviscerated if the plaintiff could simply have asserted a reverse passing off 
claim of the type asserted in Dastar. 164 In the Court's view, each of these 
cases imposed a limitation on the reach of the Lanham Act necessary to 
maintain trademark law and patent law (in these cases) in separate 
spheres.165 
But to say that a plaintiff cannot simply rename his harm to avoid sub-
stantive limitations on the assertion of the right is one thing; to extend 
that principle to prohibit any other forms of protection is quite another. 
In the First Amendment context, for example, the Court's decision in 
Hustler v. Falwell tells us that a plaintiff cannot avoid the constitutional 
limitations on defamation actions simply by renaming the cause of action 
should be free for all to use, trademark law can still provide "reasonable levels of protec-
tion" against consumer confusion). Zimmerman notes further: 
[R]ecognition of trademarks as identifiers of the source of goods or services 
predates the Constitution, and it would be odd, in my view, to argue that a 
constitutional theory of the public domain precludes continued recognition 
of them, at least for such limited purposes as identifying the source or 
preventing consumer fraud. 
/d. at 371 n.309. 
161. 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000). 
162. 489 u.s. 141, 146 (1989). 
163. 532 u.s. 23, 35 (2001). 
164. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36-37 (2003). See 
also, e.g., Chosun Int'l Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(citing Dastar and TrafFix as examples of the "general principle . . . that intellectual prop-
erty owners should not be permitted to recategorize one form of intellectual property as 
another, thereby extending the duration of protection beyond that which Congress deemed 
appropriate for their actual creative efforts"). 
165. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36-37. 
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as one for intentional infliction of emotional distress.166 But in such in-
stances, the harm alleged is identical in both causes of action: an injury to 
one's reputation caused by an act of speech by the defendant. The 
Court's decision requires plaintiffs in these circumstances to use the tort 
designed to address the harm alleged, along with its constitutional (or 
statutory) limitations. 
The same is true in each of the cases the Court cites in Dastar. In 
Samara Brothers, the Court merely required the plaintiff to satisfy the 
requirements of the Lanham Act (that is, a showing that the article al-
leged to be eligible for trademark protection actually served to identify 
source).167 In Bonito Boats, the Court required statutory schemes de-
signed to address the copying of designs-as opposed to source identifica-
tion-to align with federal patent law.168 And in TrafFix Devices, the 
Court held that a plaintiff could not use evidence of copying-again, the 
province of patent law-to prove a trademark law-based claim.169 In 
each instance, the Court was, consistent with cases like Hustler, requiring 
plaintiffs to bring their claims under the appropriate statutory scheme but 
was certainly not barring them altogether.170 
It is curious, then, why the Court seems to have shifted course at the 
trademark/copyright interface in Dastar. Consistency with these prior de-
cisions would not require barring the plaintiff's Lanham Act claim alto-
gether in the face of copyright's public domain; rather, it would simply 
require confirmation that the plaintiff was seeking to vindicate legally 
cognizable trademark law-based interests rather than dressing up a copy-
right-based harm (unauthorized copying) in Lanham Act clothing. (In-
deed, it is probably the case that the fact that Fox was almost certainly 
attempting to rescue a failed copyright claim contributed to the breadth 
of the Court's decision.) Rather than effecting an end-run around limita-
tions in trademark law brings a Lanham Act suit in the copyright or pub-
lic domain space, a content owner who does so is avoiding an end-run by 
correctly characterizing the tort at issue and thereby relinquishing the 
current advantage of the broad injunctive relief available for copyright 
infringement.171 
166. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Peter A. Jaszi, 
Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally 
Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 
603-04 (1996) (contending that the public domain has a constitutional dimension). 
167. Samara, 529 U.S. at 216. 
168. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
169. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35. 
170. A similar example involving copyright law is United States v. Martignon , 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), in which the court held that the federal criminal 
antibootlegging statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, ostensibly enacted pursuant to Congress's au-
thority under the Commerce Clause, was an impermissible end-run around the Copyright 
Clause because "its purpose is synonymous with that of the Copyright Clause." But see 
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (contra); Kiss Catalog, 
Ltd. v. Passport lnt'l Prods., Inc. 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (contra as to 
civil version of statute). 
171. The same issue might be said to lie at the heart of the debate over whether content 
owners can use extra-copyright or extra-legal measures to achieve control over their crea-
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Thus, it seems both doctrinally appropriate and possibly speech-pro-
moting to restrict copyright owners' claims under copyright law to those 
claims at the core economic justification for copyright: the exploitation of 
the work qua work.l72 Claims relating to the message conveyed by the 
use of the work-that is, claims relating to implications of sponsorship or 
endorsement-are better addressed, if at all, by trademark law-based 
principles. 
IV. ATTRIBUTIONAL GOALS AND COPYRIGHT MISUSE 
A. CoPYRIGHT MisusE 
Once a claim is determined to fall outside the scope of copyright, 
courts should consider drawing from the doctrine of copyright misuse to 
dismiss claims attempting to vindicate trademark-type interests under 
copyright law. Originally existing as an equitable doctrine only in patent 
law, the doctrine's viability in copyright law has since been well estab-
lished, albeit not in every federal circuit.173 In both intellectual property 
areas, the doctrine derives from the "unclean hands" principle used as an 
equitable backstop in many areas of law. The justification is, generally, 
tive products. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (use 
of contract); Pamela Samuelson, Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Re-
vised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (1999). Here, too, the question should be 
(whether characterized as a preemption question or not) whether the goal of the content 
owner is to restrict the use of the work in the same way as does copyright law or whether 
the content owner is seeking to enforce a different right. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus 
Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 261-62 (1945), for example, Justice Frankfurter wrote in dissent 
that a manufacturer should be bound by a contract purporting to assign an invalid patent, 
and thus could be sued for infringement of that patent, because 
[t]he essence of the principle of fair dealing which binds the assignor of a 
patent in a suit by the assignee, even though it turns out that the patent is 
invalid or lacks novelty, is that in this relation the assignor is not part of the 
general public but is apart from the general public. 
172. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 75,81 (2004) ("A focus on harm to the plaintiffs expected plans is ... 
central to the standard economic justification of copyright."); id. at 88-89 (noting that cop-
yright law currently gives authors "control over how their work is used" through the availa-
bility of injunctions, "which is problematic because injunctions are precisely what cause the 
most extreme free speech difficulties"). 
173. The doctrine has been recognized by courts in almost every circuit (some ex-
pressly, some more hypothetically). See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 
Inc., 391 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home 
Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204-06 (3d Cir. 2003); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. 
WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 
166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 
516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-77 (4th Cir. 
1990); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir. 1988); 
Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 CIV 9944 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26143, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005); Ass'n of Am. Med. Colis. v. Princeton Re-
view, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17-20 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Ind. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 
114 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 113-14 (D. Kans. 2000). The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits 
remain more equivocal. See Garcia-Goyco v. Law Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14, 21 
n.7 (1st Cir. 2005); Telecom Tech. Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831 (11th Cir. 
2004); Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distribs., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 800,810 (E.D. Mich. 
2000). 
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that a plaintiff who has taken the benefit of the public grant provided by 
copyright and/or patent law should exercise that power only in a responsi-
ble manner; concomitantly, he should not be allowed to enforce the lim-
ited monopoly in court when, as against the defendant in the case or as 
against other entities, he has overreached in exercising those rights.174 
The misuse doctrine in copyright law largely parallels its progenitor in 
patent law. The case typically identified as the landmark patent misuse 
doctrine is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,175 in which the Court 
held that the holder of a patent on a salt-depositing machine could not 
assert its patent against an alleged infringer where the patent holder had 
required licensees to use its machine only in conjunction with the patent 
holder's (unpatented) salt tabletsP6 Equitable considerations should bar 
the patent infringement suit, the Court held, because the patent monop-
oly is granted as a "special privilege" that includes as an unstated term 
the obligation to assert that privilege only in a manner consistent with 
public policy-specifically, the exclusion from the patent grant of any-
thing not included with the patented invention.177 Thus, a patentee that 
is using its monopoly in the patented article to acquire a monopoly in an 
unpatented article should be forbidden from enforcing its patent at all 
until the misuse ends, even against a defendant that is not competing in 
the unpatented good.11s 
Courts that have adopted the misuse doctrine in copyright infringe-
ment suits take much the same attitude as the Court in Morton Salt: A 
copyright holder that attempts, through the licensing of the copyrighted 
article, to obtain monopoly-like power over items outside the scope of 
the copyright should be barred from enforcing the copyright at all until 
the misuse ceases. Thus, as in the patent misuse cases, the equitable de-
fense of copyright misuse allows defendants to eliminate consideration of 
the infringement claim (and, relatedly, any considerations of whether the 
statutory fair use defense applies) by focusing on the copyright holder's 
inequitable conduct rather than on the particulars of the defendant's use 
of the content at issue. And, as with its patent law counterpart, the typi-
174. Greater attention has been paid by scholars to copyright misuse in recent years. 
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse , 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1103 (2003); 
Brett Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Doctrine of Copyright Misuse, in 1 IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 269 (Peter Yu, ed. 2007); Lydia Pal-
las Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner 
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 495, 514 (2004). 
175. 314 u.s. 488, 488 (1942). 
176. Id. at 492. 
177. ld. 
178. ld. at 493 ("Maintenance and enlargement of the attempted monopoly of the un-
patented article are dependent to some extent upon persuading the public of the validity of 
the patent, which the infringement suit is intended to establish."); see also Dawson Chern. 
Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co. 448 U.S. 176, 193 (1980) (noting that the Morton Salt Court 
"explicitly linked the doctrine of patent misuse to the 'unclean hands' doctrine traditionally 
applied by courts of equity"). A patentee may acquire a monopoly over an unpatented 
article sold by another entity where the unpatented article has no commercial noninfring-
ing use and therefore its sale constitutes contributory infringement. See 37 U.S.C.A. 
§ 271(c) (West 2006); Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 193. 
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cal copyright misuse case involves a content owner's use of licensing re-
strictions to achieve either a longer term of protection than available 
under statute or a limitation on permissible uses by the licensee that con-
flict with what would otherwise be available to the licensee pursuant to 
statute (for example, an agreement not to engage in certain fair uses or to 
develop the idea underlying the copyright).179 Finally, again as in the 
patent cases, a finding of misuse is not the death knell for a copyright 
plaintiff; it simply bars the plaintiff from seeking relief until the misuse is 
ameliorated.180 
While the doctrine has often been used at the copyright/antitrust inter-
face or to deter similarly uncompetitive activity, courts have not found 
that it need be so restricted,181 and commentators have proposed various 
other applications for the doctrine in the copyright context, including at 
the copyright/patent interface182 and within the field of anticircumvention 
rights (or "paracopyright").183 In particular, courts and commentators 
have noted that an appropriate application of the doctrine is with respect 
to assertions of copyright infringement that extend beyond the nature of 
the grant to the copyright holder or, more broadly, that conflict with the 
policy underlying the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution.184 
These policies, properly described, should include not only the built-in 
constitutional limitation of the idea/expression dichotomy and the statu-
tory fair use provisions, but also rights at the very nature of the copyright 
grant that divide the realm of copyright law from the realm of trademark 
law.185 Indeed, using the doctrine of copyright misuse to police the trade-
179. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 124 (1997). 
180. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 34, at 867. 
181. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 (3d Cir. 
2003); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc. 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990). 
182. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 34, at 920-21 (regarding software). 
183. See Burk, supra note 174, at 1132-40 (regarding anticircumvention or 
"paracopyright" rights). Other proposals include using the copyright misuse doctrine to 
force disclosure of copyrighted works, see Ralph D. Clifford, Simultaneous Copyright and 
Trade Secret Claims: Can the Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent Constitutional Double-
think?, 104 DICK. L. REv. 247, 287 (2000), or to encourage copyright owners to change 
their contracting behavior to avoid overreaching provisions more generally, see Loren, 
supra note 174, at 514. 
184. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 205-06 (asserting that the doctrine is poten-
tially appropriate where the copyright holder uses an infringement suit "to restrict expres-
sion that is critical of it") (dicta); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC, 350 F.3d at 647 
(contending that the doctrine is appropriate where a plaintiff uses a copyright infringement 
suit to obtain property protection (for example, in data) "that copyright law clearly does 
not confer"); Clifford, supra note 183, at 258; Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright 
Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901, 904 (2004); Loren, supra note 174, at 514; David Scher, 
Note, The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 89,101 (1993); 
Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First 
Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1304-07 (1991). 
185. I recognize that this is not an uncontroversial proposal. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leva!, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1128 (1990) ("Like a proprietor of 
land or an owner of contract rights, the copyright owner may sue to protect what he owns, 
regardless of his motivation. His rights, however, extend only to the limits of the 
copyright."). · 
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mark/copyright divide mirrors the application of the doctrine at other in-
tellectual property interfaces. As Brett Frischmann and Daniel Moylan 
have noted, courts have used the doctrine to serve a "coordination func-
tion" that mediates between related bodies of intellectual prop-
erty-related law;186 more particularly, Dan Burk has suggested that the 
misuse doctrine has historically been important to "curtail the forays of 
rights holders beyond the uses intended for those rights."187 
Elements of this particular application of the copyright misuse doctrine 
can be seen lurking in existing case law, although not at the forefront. 
For example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. ,188 a 
1966 case in the Second Circuit, Chief Judge Lumbard contended in a 
concurrence joined by a majority of the panel that the famous aviator and 
businessman Howard Hughes should not have been allowed to use a re-
cently acquired copyright in a series of magazine articles about him to 
thwart publication of a forthcoming biography allegedly based on those 
articles. Hughes was not using his copyright in the articles to attempt to 
engage in selective or abusive licensing, nor was he attempting to enjoin a 
competing distribution of the articles; rather, he was quite clearly using 
the copyright to restrain publication of the biography altogether. Ac-
cordingly, Judge Lumbard concluded, Hughes was asserting what may 
well have been a valid copyright but was doing so to vindicate rights 
outside those of the copyright grant: 
It has never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict the 
dissemination of information about persons in the public eye even 
though those concerned may not welcome the resulting publicity .... 
[T)he courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the 
public's right to be informed regarding matters of general interest 
when anyone seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed 
to protect interests of quite a different nature .... Here, Rosemont 
Enterprises acquired the Look copyright and sued upon it six days 
later asking injunctive relief, not with a desire to protect the value of 
the original writing but to suppress the Random House biography 
186. See, e.g., Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 174, at 274 (noting that courts have 
used the copyright misuse doctrine "to reinforce subject matter limitations and channeling 
doctrines that maintain boundaries"); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 34, at 875. Relat-
edly, Dan Burk articulates an additional function for misuse: "preserving the courts from 
the reputational damage of enforcing legal claims that might be technically legitimate but 
which would lead to socially perverse outcomes." Burk, supra note 174, at 1133. 
187. Burk, supra note 174, at 1133 ("The consistent theme of misuse cases is refusal to 
reward private extension of intellectual property rights contrary to public policy; not sim-
ply to ward off antitrust violations, or even to prevent economically anticompetitive activ-
ity."); see also William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the 
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1639, 1658 (2004) (terming the copyright misuse doctrine 
acceptable "where litigation is threatened in an effort to extract a licensing fee or other 
profit when there is no reasonable basis for supposing that the threatener's copyright has 
been infringed"); cf Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns lnt'l, 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the court "need not consider" whether a license term controlling speech of licensee consti-
tutes copyright misuse); Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1026, 1047 (2006) 
(contending that fraudulent use of copyright occurs when copyright owners attempt to pro-
hibit fair use). 
188. 366 F.2d 303, 303 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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because Hughes wished to prevent its publication.189 
Similarly, I am proposing here that greater attention be paid when con-
tent owners seek to employ copyright law to protect interests "of quite a 
different nature" from the profit-motivated rights in the work it was de-
signed to protect, as well as an alignment of copyright infringement ac-
tions with those economic interests, leaving other interests in 
communicative goods to other statutory schemes.19o 
The proposal here envisions a slightly different role for the misuse doc-
trine from the one it has played in the past.l91 Traditionally, even when it 
is used to curb activity apart from pure anticompetitive actions, the doc-
trine appears in cases in which the plaintiff is using the vehicle of licens-
ing for its copyrighted goods (for which it enjoys a monopoly during the 
copyright term) to exact from the licensee other commitments to which 
copyright law does not apply at:J.d, indeed, perhaps even affirmatively dis-
owns (the free use of factual data, for example).192 Here, however, I am 
proposing that a finding of copyright misuse derive not from the content 
owner's attempt to control extra-copyright material through the use of a 
license for copyrighted material, but rather from the content owner's at-
tempt to control rights outside the scope of those granted under copyright 
through the use of a copyright infringement suit.193 To be clear, then, a 
finding of misuse in this context is not an attempt to punish the content 
owner for exercising its right to protect its copyright by deeming such 
exercise anticompetitive;194 indeed, the content owner in this scenario re-
tains all rights to bring such a suit, so long as it does so to vindicate copy-
right-based interests and not trademark-based ones. 
189. /d. at 311, 313 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). 
190. Cf, e.g., Leva!, supra note 185, at 1134 ("[Injury to reputation or invasion of pri-
vacy from unauthorized publication] are not the types of harms against which the copyright 
law protects; despite irreparability, they should not justify an injunction based on copyright 
infringement. Only injuries to the interest in authorship are the copyright's legitimate 
concern."). 
191. See Burk, supra note 174, at 1133. 
192. But not always. See, e.g., Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 
609, 617 (D.R.I. 1976) (noting, in dicta, that had the plaintiff's copyright been otherwise 
valid, the court would have declined to enforce it due to the plaintiff's conduct, including 
publishing a misleading "copyright warning"). 
193. For similar suggestions, see, for example, JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Ex· 
panding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital Free Speech, 13 TEx. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 83, 
114 (2004) (proposing a doctrine of "public policy copyright misuse" based in part on an 
argument that "copyright should not be used to vindicate economic interests unrelated to 
the marketability of the protected work itself'); Justin Hughes, supra note 150, at 1082 
("We need more courts to adopt the reasoning of Online Policy Group v. Diebold [337 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004)]: sometimes a copyright claim ... is so obviously outside 
the borders of the copyright owner's rights, the action constitutes an abuse of process."). 
The court in Diebold held that the corporate plaintiff had no copyright interest in internal 
e-mails posted to a publicly available website because it did not intend to exploit the e-
mails in the marketplace. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. 
194. Thus, this is not the type of situation that is prohibited under patent law by statute, 
see 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(3) (West 2006), or generally by Noerr immunity, see Prof'! Real 
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993). Cf Aaron 
Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 29 (1998). 
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It would, of course, be possible to approximate the goal of this propo-
sal not by turning to trademark law-type concepts but instead by re-
forming copyright law. In fact, other commentators have suggested such 
proposals, focusing on the fair use provision.195 I believe, however, that 
using the existing Lanham Act is preferable for two reasons. First, as a 
practical matter, application of the copyright misuse doctrine can be ac-
complished judicially within the existing statutory framework, providing 
both the necessary flexibility and a more immediate solution. (It is prob-
ably safe to say that in the current legislative climate, reforms to the fair 
use provision will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.) Second, an 
amendment to the fair use provision will not likely provide the reassur-
ance that subsequent creators need because its application depends on a 
preliminary finding of infringement; whether the defendant will enjoy a 
safe harbor then depends on the whim of the court.l96 By contrast, the 
copyright misuse doctrine engages in this inquiry by focusing on the 
plaintiff's conduct;197 moreover, under this proposal, it does not foreclose 
a remedy entirely but rather requires the content owner to seek relief 
under a more appropriate legal regime. 
B. LocATING THE A TrRIBUTIONAL INTEREST 
As I have discussed, copyright law, traditionally explained, is aimed at 
providing the creator an incentive to create by reserving to her for a lim-
ited time the right to exploit the work itself-to control the number of 
copies, the way in which the work is distributed, and whether or not the 
work is displayed or performed. But for many creators, particularly indi-
vidual creators, the profit motivation is not paramount. Rather, the crea-
tor is motivated most by the public knowledge that she is the creator-by 
attribution of the work to her. Indeed, as others have noted, such cre-
ators value wide dissemination of their work over compensation, and so 
benefit from the fair use doctrine and, even, the movement of their work 
to the public domain, both of which ensure that their work reaches as 
large an audience as possible.198 Although this contention can probably 
195. See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 21, at 41-46 (proposing that the fair use factors of 
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 be amended to include consideration of whether the alleged infringer 
has provided attribution to the author of the work); Kozinski & Newman, supra note 11, at 
525-26 (proposing an elimination of § 107's fair use provisions for derivative works and 
generally limiting relief to actual damages plus profits attributable to the infringement, 
except damages attributable to criticism of the copyrighted work). 
196. Bradford, supra note 11, at 747 ("In copyright secondary use cases, courts presume 
harm to the work through unauthorized use. They place the burden on the user to prove 
the value of the secondary use through affirmative defenses such as parody."); but see id. at 
749 (noting the difficulty of separating out copyright claims based on consumer perception 
given the current broad derivative works right). 
197. Note, supra note 184, at 1306 ("Unlike misuse doctrine, however, the fair use in-
quiry directs courts' attention to the social value of the defendant's conduct rather than the 
social harm caused by the plaintiff's use of its copyright"). 
198. See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1532, 
1581 (1989); Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution 
95 GEo. L.J. 49, 50 (2006) ("Credit matters in an information economy because it is diffi-
cult to measure worker knowledge directly in the way that the ability of typists and rna-
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be supported only anecdotally and not empirically, it seems safe to con-
clude that the two things that virtually all creators desire is to receive 
credit when appropriate and to eliminate the suggestion of association 
when it is not.199 
While some commentators have located the attributional and/or associ-
ational interests in communicative goods in the personality of the author, 
it seems that these interests also have an important relationship to con-
sumer reaction.200 We might say, then, that if the law is to give greater 
protection than it does to such interests, it should do so when attribution 
or association matter to consumers, much as trademark law does with 
respect to noncommunicative goods. Consumers of communicative 
goods, as I described earlier, have an interest in sorting mechanisms for 
those goods that are free from intentional disruption to the extent possi-
ble, and creators of communicative goods have an interest in minimizing 
chinists of the industrial economy could be tested simply by watching them perform a 
task."). Of course, the conclusion that many creators are not motivated by economic in-
centive, particularly in the academic context, is a bit solipsistic, and others have sounded a 
cautionary note in this regard. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 32, at 149: 
/d. 
The case of the driven genius immune to financial incentives seems too spec-
ulative to treat it as the norm for creation of works of authorship. A safe 
stance is to assume that creators are generally interested in cash and respond 
to its lure, perhaps leaving the door open for a contrary showing in the unu-
sual case. 
199. One datapoint in this regard comes from Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, 
who have described how almost all authors releasing works pursuant to the Creative Com-
mons license-including those who place little or no copyright-based restrictions on distri-
bution of their work-continue to require attribution as a condition of use. Anupam 
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1331, 
1361 (2004). The Copyright Office took note of this statistic in proposing that the limited 
remedies for infringement of orphan works depend, in part, on the infringer's having at-
tributed the infringed work. See http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf, 
at 110-11. For a discussion of the evolution of Creative Commons, in particular its move 
to making attribution a default element of every license, see Lastowka, supra note 21, at 
35-38. 
200. I have discussed the trademark-like aspects of authorship in Heymann, supra note 
44. Many commentators, however, justify attributional rights in terms of their intrinsic 
and/or spiritual value to the creator rather than for their benefits to the consumer. See, e.g., 
Kwall, supra note 32, at 1973 (asserting that attribution rights are protected under a moral 
rights regime "as integral components of a work's meaning and message as conceived by 
the original author as a result of her endowed creative gift"); see also Benkler, supra note 
55, at 193 (noting that a Hegelian view of intellectual property sees attribution as having to 
do with "the sense that the value of the thing as an expression of self is in its being an 
expression of a particular self-its author-and not a fungible expression of human crea-
tivity as a general category"). Not all attribution proposals are derived from intellectual 
property rights, however. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 198, at 53 (proposing that a right of 
attribution be regarded as an implied term of every employment contract). 
A consideration of whether these proposals can or should exist simultaneously with the 
one suggested here is beyond the scope of the Article. While I believe that the attribu-
tionaUassociational interests in communicative goods map fairly well onto existing unfair 
competition doctrine, and so are worth considering within that framework, I do not mean 
to suggest here that, for this reason, consideration of additional regimes is illegitimate. In 
short, I am suggesting in this Article that unfair competition law is a preferable framework 
for dealing with attributionaUassociational interests over our current copyright law; I take 
no position here as to whether it is a preferable framework over our current copyright law 
with an additional moral rights component. 
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this disruption. Thus, although creators may have a personal interest in 
correct attributional signals, that interest has a strong (and existing) legal 
resonance when considered as a means to the end of diminishing con-
sumer confusion. Courts (at least pre-Dastar) justified locating attribu-
tional rights in the Lanham Act on this basis.201 
This is not to say, however, that a creator obtains a legally cognizable 
attributional right the moment a work is created. In order to make possi-
ble the claim that the defendant is causing confusion as to the "sponsor-
ship or approval"202 of his goods or services by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's 
work (as used in the defendant's work) must be recognizable as that of 
the plaintiff. It may well be true-and this is a positive attribute-that 
few creators will be able to state such a case. Thus, while it is possible 
that, at the threshold, Lionel Richie's estate has a legally cognizable claim 
that "Endless Love" satisfies this requirement (although it may ultimately 
fail to satisfy the requirement that viewers of the Bush/Blair video will 
believe that Richie sponsored or approved the video), Art Rogers's case 
is significantly weaker.203 The move to trademark law-based principles is 
thus both doctrinally more coherent and, I believe, ultimately speech-
enhancing. 
Thus, locating attribution as an economic interest of consumers rather 
than an economic right of authors-the divide between trademark-type 
interests and copyright interests-ultimately benefits subsequent cre-
ators. As discussed earlier, a copyright infringer will often (although not 
always) be enjoined from making use of the work at all, assuming that he 
is not fortunate enough to be graced with a favorable finding from the 
court as to fair use.204 But utilizing trademark law as a model yields the 
possibility of a remedy better tailored to the harm: an injunction that al-
201. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311-12 (2d Cir. 
1934) (movie title); Simon & Schuster, Inc v. Dove Audio, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 279, 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (book title); cf. Rigamonti, supra note 15, at 360 (noting that "moral rights 
law is considered an integral part of copyright law" because "moral rights are rights in 
copyrightable works similar in structure to economic rights"). 
202. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (West 2006). 
203. Cf. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting in dicta that 
the district court correctly dismissed singer's false implied endorsement claim based on use 
of a song in a commercial on the ground that no reasonable jury could have found an 
implied endorsement); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (af-
firming judgment for a singer on a false implied endorsement claim for use of imitation of a 
distinctive voice in a commercial). The kinds of cases I am addressing in this Article, which 
seem to have false endorsement, if anything, at their core (and not misappropriation theo-
ries), are thus not appropriate candidates for a right of publicity claim. See RoGER E . 
ScHECHTER & JoHN R. THOMAS, INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY: THE LAw oF CoPYRIGHTs, 
PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 266 (2003) (describing the difference). 
204. See, e.g., RoBERT A. GoRMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, CoPYRIGHT 909-12 (7th ed. 
2006) {discussing the circumstances under which injunctions are issued pursuant to 17 
U.S.C.A. § 502); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006) 
(noting that equitable considerations apply); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U .S. 483, 505 
(2001) (noting that injunctions need not always issue in copyright infringement cases). See 
generally James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 983,983 (1990); James Thompson, Note, Permanent Injunctions in Copy-
right Infringement: Moral and Economic Justifications for Balancing Individual Rights In-
stead of Following Harsh Rules, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 477, 477 {1998). 
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lows the defendant's continued use of the work at issue but requires her 
to address likely consumer confusion as to sponsorship or authorization 
of the later work by the author of the former work. 205 
Taking these points together, then, leads to my proposal: The trade-
mark/copyright interface should be treated no differently from other in-
tellectual property interfaces, such that claims asserting harm relating to 
the interest in exploiting the work itself should be addressed by copyright 
law, while claims asserting harm relating to the way the source of the 
work is presented to consumers should be addressed by trademark 
law-based schemes. Neither claim is duplicative of the other, and both 
claims operate independently, such that the availability of a claim under 
copyright law (that is, whether the work is under copyright or not, or 
whether the defendant's incorporation of the work qualifies as fair use) 
has no bearing on whether a claim is cognizable under trademark law 
principles. 
205. The injunction may therefore require the provision of a disclaimer or, perhaps, an 
acknowledgment. I recognize, however, that the effectiveness of disclaimers is still a mat-
ter of debate. See, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) ("based 
on" disclaimer); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 
1987) ("[W]here, as here, the likelihood of consumer confusion is far less than substantial, 
we believe that it is within the district court's discretion to grant disclaimer relief."); Am. 
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir. 1986): 
[W]here it is not feasible in practice to avoid the potential for confusion 
through the selection of alternative non-functional elements or the manner in 
which one combines imitated functional ones, the most that can be required 
is clear labeling disclosing source or other reasonable steps to minimize the 
risk of confusion. 
/d.; Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 
(2d Cir. 1983): 
Disclaimers are a favored way of alleviating consumer confusion as to source 
or sponsorship. Absolute prohibitions of speech ... are improper where 
there is any possibility that an explanation or disclaimer will suffice .... The 
First Amendment demands use of a disclaimer where there is a reasonable 
possibility that it will suffice to alleviate consumer confusion. 
/d.; Warner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1934) (enjoining 
distribution of film without a disclaimer disassociating plaintiff); Matrix Essential, Inc. v. 
Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 280, 282 (D. La. 1991) ("not affiliated" dis-
claimer); Hosp. for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67, 73 (E.D. 
Va. 1980) ("based on" or "derived from" disclaimer); Bone, supra note 48, at 2182-83 
(proposing use of disclaimers in merchandising cases); Denicola, supra note 88, at 613-14 
(discussing qualified injunctions); Dinwoodie, supra note 27, at 728 (supporting "limited 
'regulatory' relief (such as confusion-minimizing labeling of defendant's similar products or 
corrective advertising by the defendant) being accorded the owner of a distinctive trade 
dress that is found to be functional"); Kwall, supra note 32, at 2003-12 (proposing attribu-
tion as part of a moral rights regime); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, 
Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation (2001), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/pa-
pers/langeand.pdf (suggesting that a requirement of acknowledgment "should play an ordi-
nary role in cases of transformative critical appropriation"); cf e.g., Jacob Jacoby & Robert 
Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: More Trouble Than 
They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 40 (1986) (contending that disclaimers are 
generally ineffective); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy for Trademark Infringe-
ment: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59, 61 (1986) (same). Professor 
Radin suggests, moreover, that a disclaimer might work more harm to the plaintiff by link-
ing her name and the defendant's name in the consumer's mind. Radin, supra, at 64. 
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Hav"ing reached this equilibrium, intellectual property law should 
therefore no longer countenance a content owner's use of copyright law 
to assert trademark law-based interests. Indeed, where a content owner 
attempts to take advantage of the broad remedies available under copy-
right law to restrain uses of his material that do not relate to exploitation 
of the work but instead suggest an affiliation or association with the con-
tent owner, courts should consider that attempt an instance of copyright 
misuse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property scholars who are somewhat hesitant to recognize 
more robust attribution rights via trademark law are, I think, con-
cerned-and correctly so-that such recognition will change the current 
landscape of copyright's public domain. If Disney is permitted to exer-
cise trademark rights over Mickey Mouse after its copyright in the char-
acter expires, then the public will be deprived of some uses of that 
material, uses to which it thought it was entitled.206 But the harm should 
be fairly minimal if courts are vigilant: Disney can exercise these trade-
mark rights only if it can demonstrate a likelihood of confusion through 
the defendant's use. Parodies, satires, and the like are presumably not 
candidates for a successful suit, since such uses almost certainly depend 
on the consumer's recognition that the original author is not the 
source;207 fan fiction and similar endeavors may also fall into the same 
category, depending on how the market understands such pursuits. But if 
the appearance of a Mickey Mouse statue at the front of a non-Disney 
theme park after the copyright has expired nevertheless suggests to pa-
trons that Disney has some affiliation with or sponsorship of the theme 
park, it does not seem to be beyond the bounds of rationality to permit 
206. See Moffat, supra note 27, at 1507-08. 
207. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1997) ("In a traditional trademark infringement suit founded on the likelihood of con-
fusion rationale, the claim of parody is ... merely a way of phrasing the traditional re-
sponse that customers are not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or 
approval."); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1992) 
("Although parody necessarily evokes the original trademark, effective parody also dimin-
ishes any risk of consumer confusion."); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell 
Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989): 
A parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: 
that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a par-
ody. To the extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not only 
a poor parody but also vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer 
will be confused. 
/d. RICHARD A. PosNER, THE LrrrLE BooK oF PLAGIARISM 17-18 (2007) ("Often copying 
is not acknowledged because it is known to the intended readership .. . . Allusion is not 
plagiarism because the reader is expected to recognize the allusion."). While courts have 
tended to treat satires differently from parodies in copyright law cases by concluding that a 
licensing market exists for the former but not for the latter, see, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 
109 F.3d at 1400-03, it is unclear whether this is, in fact, true. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 
21, at 12. 
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Disney to take action.2os 
To be clear, the proposal in this Article is not a limitation on the right 
to copy as such. To the extent one views copyright's public domain as 
permitting copying without regard to consumer confusion, this Article's 
proposal works a more significant incursion.209 But, properly viewed, the 
proposal does not permit injunctions against copying, as copyright law 
would, and thus reduces the tension that occurs if plaintiffs were permit-
ted to use trademark law to prevent copying altogether.210 Indeed, per-
haps one barrier to adoption of this proposal is the now well-accepted 
inclusion of trademarks within what we call intellectual "property," a 
term that suggests the ability to restrict use altogether through injunctive 
relief.211 Copyright law, in its provisions that allow content holders to 
control the use of the property qua property and define its metes and 
bounds, tends to resemble real property more than trademark law, which 
provides a rights-holder not with the ability to control the trademark qua 
208. Cf Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public 
Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 429, 432 (1994) ("[I]f I, the consumer, don't 
want to see an animated film about Snow White and the Seven Dwarves unless the Disney 
Company produced it, then Disney should be able to stop Filmation from deceiving me 
about who made the film, 'Snow White: The Adventure Continues' .. .. "); id. at 432-33 
(expressing concern that trademark law has not been so limited to such instances with 
respect to protection of characters); Catherine Seville, Peter Pan's Rights: "To Die Will Be 
an Awfully Big Adventure," 51 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 1, 26 (2003) ("Although the de 
facto extension of copyright beyond its statutory term is an obvious concern in [passing off] 
cases, it is probably defensible."). 
209. See Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations and the 
Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 476 (1998) ("[P]ermitting 
plaintiffs to rely on § 43(a) to prevent the copying of product features creates a distinct 
tension with Congress' plan in enacting the patent and copyright laws."). 
210. Cf Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg), 50 F.3d 189, 207 (3d Cir. 1995) ("It is not 
unfair competition for someone to trade off the good will of a product; it is only unfair to 
deceive consumers as to the origin of one's goods and thereby trade off the good will of a 
prior producer.") (citation omitted); Davis, supra note 68, at 652 (noting that the Intellec-
tual Property Clause of the Constitution would not preclude liability "if a defendant's cop-
ying of entirely functional features is coupled with separate and independent acts of unfair 
competition such as 'palming off,' false advertising, or deceptive trade practices. On the 
contrary, relief under these circumstances is not only permissible, but appropriate."); 
Daniel M. McClure, Trademark and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal 
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305,307 (1979) ("Competitors are free to produce identical 
or similar products, and it would seem that preventing competitors from using each other's 
trademarks amounts to only a slight impediment to free competition."); David S. 
Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289,306 
(1998-1999) (noting that patent law "gives exclusionary rights to the owner," while trade-
mark law "seeks to make sure that the competitive market operates properly"); cf Lange, 
supra note 30, at 177 n.137 (noting a difference between moral rights that ensure recogni-
tion and moral rights that protect the "integrity" of the work and suggesting that the latter 
may conflict with rights in the public domain). In proposing that a right of attribution be 
considered to be an implied term in every employment contract, Catherine L. Fisk suggests 
that the remedy for failure to attribute would therefore "not be an injunction against distri-
bution of the work without attribution" but rather "a right to share the reputation benefits 
of the authorship." Fisk, supra note 198, at 114. 
211. David Lange has suggested something similar, although he seems to retreat from 
this suggestion a paragraph later. See Lange, supra note 142, at 470 (characterizing a for-
mer article as embodying a proposal to, inter alia, shift intellectual property law to a liabil-
ity regime and a concomitant move to disclaimers rather than injunctions); id. (noting that 
these assertions are "not quite what I would say today"). 
2007] The Trademark/Copyright Divide 101 
trademark but only, at best, with the ability to control certain associations 
or relationships between trademark meaning and the mark itself.212 
I do not pretend in proffering this suggestion that the law of unfair 
competition always maps easily onto communicative products. Consum-
ers may not always think of content creators as "sources" in the tradi-
tional, trademark-like sense, and even where this understanding exists, it 
may be difficult to establish the same "brand equals source" dynamic as 
exists in the usual goods/services context such that the typical likelihood-
of-confusion analysis can be conducted. As commentators have noted, 
consumers' understanding of whether the use of a name or other element 
on a communicative good reflects a suggestion of sponsorship or other 
approval may depend on someti1ing of a feedback loop: consumers will 
have this understanding if the courts tell them this is what they are to 
expect, while courts will reach this conclusion if they perceive consumers 
to have this understanding.213 In the end, this may mean simply that the 
point of equilibrium between confusion and lack thereof may shift in tan-
dem with the law and/or consumer perceptions. I do not think, however, 
that the idea that attribution of source in communicative goods will cease 
to have relevance for consumers altogether. 
Moreover, as I suggested earlier, this is a modest proposal, in which-
as is often the case-the devil lies in the details. Given the variety of uses 
that second-generation creators make of others' work, the line at the 
trademark/copyright divide is not as sharp as it might be at the other 
intellectual property interfaces. In addition, the current uncertainty sur-
rounding the interplay between derivative uses and claimed licensing 
markets214 may enable copyright owners to easily recharacterize claims 
and thereby evade the restrictions this Article proposes to implement. 
But asking courts to attempt to smoke out pretext is not assigning them 
an unfamiliar task, and the fact that the efficacy of the tool I am propos-
ing might ultimately be determined case by case is not a basis, in and of 
itself, to reject it altogether. 
But allowing trademark law principles to play even this more minor 
role in copyright's public domain, and to accord it a dominant role against 
the use of copyright in appropriate circumstances, has the potential to 
solve both the concerns of content owners and the concerns of subse-
quent creators: It provides a vehicle for the attribution claims most origi-
nal creators appear to desire (although it is a vehicle only few can ride), 
and it releases some of copyright's hold over the dissemination and use of 
works that subsequent creators claim to need. So to recognize the trade-
212. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]rademarks 
are not monopolies. Others can produce designs similar to the trademark so long as there 
is no likelihood of consumer confusion."). 
213. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile 
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 485-89 (2005); Jacob Jacoby, Sense and 
Nonsense in Measuring Sponsorship Confusion, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 63, 85 
(2006). 
214. See generally Lemley, supra note 21. 
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mark/copyright divide is simply to preserve this distinction: to require 
content owners to assert attribution claims as such during the term of 
copyright, and to permit them to continue to do so afterward. Copyright 
law does not forbid this and, I believe, might be enhanced by it. 
